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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three separate essays.
In the first essay of the thesis I develop a quantitative framework of firm dynamics
where the size of the informal sector is determined by financial constraints and the
burden of government taxation. Informal sector firms do not pay taxes but have no
access to external finance and face sector specific costs that limit their optimal scale
of production. For taxes and financial constraints parameterized for a country like
Egypt, I find losses in total factor productivity of over 28%, with drops in the wage
level of 68% and in output per worker of 60% relative to the benchmark economy
that resembles the US. I then evaluate the impact of three types of policies. I find
that the effects of a complete elimination of formal sector registration costs are small
(in contrast with theoretical work that ignores financial constraints and the informal
sector). I evaluate the introduction of a stochastic tax-enforcement technology that
detects informal sector firms and forces them to register with a probability that depends
on the scale of production. The effects of this policy are negative: wages and output
per worker are lower as well as aggregate TFP, in spite of the fact that the size of
the informal sector is reduced. Improving the access to credit for formal sector firms
increases wages, aggregate TFP and output per worker while reducing the size of the
informal sector.
In my second essay I study the consequences of low financial development in an en-
vironment where firms can invest to increase productivity. Lower financial development
(i.e., lower access to credit) increases the dispersion of the marginal productivity of
capital across firms (misallocation), therefore lowering aggregate production efficiency.
However, models of firm dynamics with financial constraints generate modest losses due
to misallocation relative to those found in the empirical literature. For my version of
this benchmark I compute losses of 3.8% of aggregate TFP for Colombia and 7.3% for
Mexico. I revisit these results by constructing a quantitative model of firm dynamics
with endogenous accumulation of firm productivity. In this model, financial constraints
diminish the incentives of firms to invest in increasing firm productivity, reducing firm
iii
productivity growth. Additionally, for the firms that make investments to increase pro-
ductivity, financial constraints become more persistent (compared to a model where
firm productivity is purely stochastic). This channel amplifies the losses from misallo-
cation to 15.8% for Colombia and 14.7% for Mexico. The model can partially account
for the lower life-cycle productivity growth of firms in economies with underdeveloped
financial markets and is consistent with more persistent constraints (measured through
capital/output ratios) for the most productive units in a panel of manufacturing estab-
lishments for Colombia.
In the last essay of this thesis, Naoki Takayama and I study the long-run con-
sequences of recessions for young individuals and the impact of government taxation.
Recessions generate large increases in youth unemployment rates and young unemployed
workers suffer significant losses in terms of the expected present discounted value of their
labor earnings. We build a life cycle model with on-the-job human capital accumula-
tion and aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks (extended to consider ex-ante
heterogeneous workers). The unemployment rate for young workers is higher and we
find an important quantitative impact of the tax-wedge (consistent with cross-country
empirical estimates): in countries where the tax-wedge is higher, unemployment rates
are amplified, particularly for young workers. We compute the long-term earnings losses
of individuals that lose their job in different states of the economy and find that losses
are bigger: (1) in worse aggregate states of the economy, (2) for younger individuals,
(3) in economies with a higher tax wedge, (4) for ex-ante lower ability individuals.
iv
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Chapter 1
Informal Sector Misallocation
1.1 Introduction
In many developing countries, like Turkey and Egypt, the informal economy accounts
for over 30% of non-agricultural employment1 and well above 30% of GDP.2 The infor-
mal sector has long been associated with financial underdevelopment and the excessive
burden of taxes and regulation, and attributed significant losses in terms of aggregate
productivity, capital accumulation and output. This paper has two objectives: (1) to
quantify the losses associated with the existence of a large informal sector, (2) to eval-
uate policies intended to ameliorate these losses.
I build a model of entrepreneurship and stochastic firm dynamics based upon the
frameworks of occupational choice and industry equilibrium of Lucas (1978) and Hopen-
hayn (1992). Individuals differ in their ability to operate a decreasing returns to scale
technology but are homogeneous as workers. More able entrepreneurs set-up firms and
decide whether to belong to the formal or informal sector (an early example of self-
selection in a static environment is Rauch, 1991). The trade-off is the following: firms
1Statistics of informal sector employment are discussed in Section 1.2.
2Schneider & Enste (2000) describe nine widely applied methodologies of estimating the size of the
shadow economy, highlighting their respective advantages and weaknesses. Data based on labor force
and micro-business surveys (as the ones used here) are generally preferred. The shadow economy includes
all market-based legal production of goods and services that are concealed from public authorities to
avoid taxation, social security contributions and compliance with regulation in general, while pure
household production, voluntary nonprofit (social) services and criminal activities are excluded.
1
2in the informal sector avoid taxation and the costs of registration and face an additional
cost of production that represents the costs of not having access to enforcement of com-
mercial contracts, demands from corrupt government officials, difficulties in reaching
customers, etc. (De Soto, 1989; Perry et al., 2007). This cost limits the optimal scale of
firms in the informal sector. The size of the informal sector is determined by financial
constraints and the burden of government taxation.
Financial constraints have a leading role in the model. All firms have to make in-
put payments at the beginning of each period, before production takes place. These
payments have to be financed and entrepreneurs face collateral constraints. Informal
sector entrepreneurs have no access to external finance.3 The entrepreneur may choose
to start-off in the informal sector and later transition to the formal sector depending
on his assets and ability4. In equilibrium the size of the informal sector depends on the
burden of taxes and access to credit in the formal sector. Intuitively, lower access to
credit in the formal sector reduces the demand for labor and the wage level. This leads
to individuals with lower entrepreneurial ability to set-up firms in the informal sector.
The quantitative exercise consists in comparing a benchmark model economy cali-
brated to be consistent with well functioning financial markets and a small informal sec-
tor (the US) with economies with underdeveloped financial markets and medium/large
informal sectors (Turkey and Egypt). I find that the frictions considered go a long way
in accounting for the differences in aggregate total factor productivity (TFP), the av-
erage size of firms and output per capita. Then I evaluate the impact of three different
policies: (1) the complete elimination of the costs of registration in the formal sector,
(2) an improvement of access to credit in the formal sector, (3) the introduction of a
tax-enforcement technology where informal sector firms may be detected with a proba-
bility that is increasing in the scale of production, and then are forced to register and
3The difficulties for informal sector firms to collateralize their assets were already stressed in the
work of De Soto (1989). In the same manner, Straub (2005), Cata˜o et al. (2009) and Perry et al. (2007)
emphasize the requirements of financial institutions such as credible documentation of physical location
and pledgeable assets of the firms, their financial statements, etc. which, because of their nature, are
not feasible for informal sector firms.
4Alternatively, Levenson & Maloney (1998) analyze the dynamic nature of informality in a model
where entrepreneurial ability is initially unknown, surviving and more able entrepreneurs transition to
the formal sector as they learn their ability.
3enter the formal sector. I find that the impact of a policy that eliminates registration
costs is small relative to the observed differences in aggregate variables between Egypt
and the US. This is consistent with country level case studies that analyze this type of
reforms. The results from the tax-enforcement technology are negative: wages, TFP
and output per worker are reduced even as the size of the informal sector falls. Increas-
ing the access to credit is key in reducing the size of the informal sector and improving
aggregate outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 I overview the related
literature. In Section 1.3 I compare the size distribution of firms, define the informal
sector and provide estimates of its size in Turkey and Egypt and exploit firm level data
to document empirical regularities of informal sector firms compared to those in the
formal sector. The model is presented in S.1.4. A brief characterization of the equilib-
rium and sources of misallocation are discussed in S.1.5. Calibration and institutional
parameters are discussed in S.1.6. In S.1.7 I present the main quantitative results and
conduct and discuss policy experiments in S.1.8. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Relation to the Literature
This paper builds upon several strands of the development literature. A brief overview
follows.
Misallocation. This paper is related to a literature that underscores the macroe-
conomic implications of distortions to the allocation of resources across firms, typically
focusing on aggregate TFP and output losses, capital accumulation and the size and
productivity distribution of firms. Hsieh & Klenow (2009) find that gaps in marginal
products of labor and capital across plants can explain a large part of the differences in
TFP between China and India compared to the US. Busso et al. (2012) perform a similar
empirical exercise for Mexico analyzing informal and formal sector firms. Restuccia &
Rogerson (2008) analyze the potential quantitative effects of idiosyncratic tax schemes,
4suggesting the importance of evaluating specific distortions. Accordingly, Guner, Ven-
tura & Xu (2008) and Garcia-Santana & Pijoan-Mas (2011) study policies that impose
restrictions on the size of firms. Barseghyan & DiCecio (2011) asses the role of en-
try costs, including regulatory/legal fees for registering firms as well as non-regulatory
sunken costs. Financial frictions have also been extensively studied. For recent quan-
titative examples see Buera, Kaboski & Shin (2011) who analyze endogenous collateral
constraints and Greenwood, Sanchez & Wang (2013) who focus on the role of costly
state verification, among many others5. Midrigan & Xu (2013) challenge the view that
financial constraints can represent a quantitatively relevant source of misallocation, ar-
guing that firms can accumulate assets to escape this restriction reducing their impact
on aggregate efficiency.
Informal Sector. There is a sizable literature that analyzes the determinants of
the size of the informal sector. Many results are now standard:6 the size of the infor-
mal sector decreases as credit availability improves in the formal sector (Straub, 2005;
Antunes & Cavalcanti, 2007; Quintin, 2008; Cata˜o et al., 2009; D’Erasmo & Moscoso-
Boedo, 2012); the size of the informal sector increases with labor-market restrictions,
heavier regulation of entry and the tax burden of the formal sector and decreases with
enforcement of legal obligations (Djankov et al., 2002; Ihrig & Moe, 2004; Antunes &
Cavalcanti, 2007; Perry et al., 2007; Prado, 2011; Leal Ordon˜ez, 2013). At the firm
level, compliance with regulation is associated with better access to external finance
and informal sector firms are found to be less capital and skilled-labor intensive, less
productive, smaller and younger (Levenson & Maloney, 1998; Amaral & Quintin, 2006;
Perry et al., 2007; La Porta & Shleifer, 2008; Pratap & Quintin, 2008; World Bank,
2010; de Paula & Scheinkman, 2011; Busso, Fazio & Levy, 2012).
5The growth of smaller firms is particulary constrained by the underdevelopment of the financial
system. This mechanism has been found to be empirically more robust than other obstacles to firm-
growth such as inefficient regulation and taxation, inadequate enforcement of property rights, political
instability, poor provision of infrastructure, etc. (Beck & Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, 2006).
6Schneider & Enste (2000), Tybout (2000) and Perry et al. (2007) offer extensive sets of references
related to the informal sector. The literature also analyzes other aspects of the informal sector related to
inequality, labor market segmentation, human capital accumulation, the consequences of trade reform,
optimal audit policies, corruption and rent-seeking bureaucracies. These topics are outside the scope
of this project. De Soto (1989), a classic reference in the literature, already emphasized the impact of
an overburdening regulatory system, weak property rights enforcements and lack of access to external
finance in the informal sector.
5These two strands of literature are linked. Relatively recent papers have analyzed
the informal sector in models that incorporate firm dynamics. Amaral & Quintin (2006)
and Antunes & Cavalcanti (2007) combine occupational choice with credit constraints
to quantify the role of this friction taking into account the role of the informal sector.
Quintin (2008) finds that lax tax enforcement alone does not suffice to generate a large
informal sector and contractual imperfections are needed. D’Erasmo & Moscoso-Boedo
(2012) develop a model of firm dynamics with imperfect debt enforcement and also eval-
uate the impact on misallocation, capital accumulation and the size distribution of firms.
The present paper is perhaps most closely related to D’Erasmo & Moscoso-Boedo
(2012). As in their model I incorporate the effect of entry costs, taxes and financial
frictions (bankruptcy efficiency in their case, collateral constraints in my model). They
find that these frictions can explain a drop in total factor productivity of up to 25%.
The effect of each friction is analyzed and they find that entry costs account for 3/4 of
TFP differences across countries. In contrast to their work, in my model a larger in-
formal sector is associated with lower wages. This provides an incentive for individuals
with lower entrepreneurial ability to set up firms, an important mechanism in my model.
Different authors have considered the role of tax enforcement: Fortin, Marceau &
Savard (1997), de Paula & Scheinkman (2011), Prado (2011), Leal Ordon˜ez (2013). It
is not surprising that this type of policy has received attention in policy and corporate
circles (UK National Audit Office, 2008; McKinsey Global Institute, 2006). I extend
the consideration of government tax enforcement to a setting with firm dynamics.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section I document the key empirical facts that motivate this paper. First I
compare the distribution of employment and firms by size class for the US, Turkey and
Egypt. In Turkey and Egypt a very large share of the non-agricultural private labor
force belongs to very small firms (less than 10 workers), which is typically observed for
6developing economies. Next, I define informal sector employment and provide measures
of its size in these countries. This information will guide the calibration of the model.
Then, using micro-level databases for Turkey, Egypt and Morocco, I document how
the formal/informal status of the firm is related to education and experience of the
manager, size and age of the firm, capital/labor ratios and revenue per worker, the ratio
of skilled workers in the firm, while controlling for other variables that are standard in
the literature.7
1.3.1 Distribution of Employment and Firms
In the US firms with less than 10 workers, represent 74.5% of the total number of firms
and account for 12% of employment.8 For Turkey and Egypt the share of firms with less
than 10 workers is approximately 95% and account for 67% and 77% of employment,
respectively.
Table 1.1: Size Distribution of Firms
dist. of employment <10 10-49 ≥50
US 11.8 19.1 69.1
Turkey 67.0 16.0 17.0
Egypt 77.3 10.3 12.4
dist. of firms <10 10-49 ≥50
US 74.5 20.5 5.0
Turkey 95.0 3.2 1.8
Egypt 95.7 4.0 0.3
Recent work by Garcia-Santana & Ramos (2013) documents, at a cross-country level,
a significant relationship between average firm size and productivity both at the micro
and aggregate levels. Unsurprisingly, it is widely accepted that the preponderance of
smaller firms in developing countries is related to the informal sector (see Tybout, 2000).
7Examples in this literature are: Levenson & Maloney (1998) for Mexico, de Paula & Scheinkman
(2011) for Brazil, World Bank (2010) for Turkey (for this country I use the same dataset) and La Porta
& Shleifer (2008) using cross-country firm level data.
8See the Appendix for a description of the sources for Table 1.1.
71.3.2 The Informal Sector
In this section the concept of informal sector is defined and estimates of its size are
provided for the countries of interest. As emphasized in the literature, informality en-
compasses different phenomena. In developed economies, informality is generally asso-
ciated with tax evasion and undeclared labor in registered firms. In emerging economies
it is typically associated with small unregistered firms that avoid all or most forms of
taxation. I make an important distinction here, following ILO (2012):
Employment in the informal sector is an enterprise-based concept and
covers persons working in units that have informal characteristics in relation
to, e.g., the legal status, registration, size, the registration of the employ-
ees, their bookkeeping practices, etc. Informal employment is a job-based
concept and encompasses those persons whose main jobs lack basic social
or legal protections or employment benefits and may be found in the formal
sector, informal sector or households.
Informal employment can include workers in larger firms with relatively better ac-
cess to finance that comply with most of their legal obligations. The focus of this paper
is on the informal sector. In Turkey, 32% of employment in non-agricultural activi-
ties was unregistered (informal) in 2003 (this statistic is 52% for total employment).
I compute informal sector employment as the sum of unregistered employers, unreg-
istered self-employed and unpaid unregistered family members and casual employees,
which amounted to 21.2% of non-agricultural private employment9 in 2003 (TurkStat
and ILO Labor Statistics). Estimates of informal sector employment in the US are
not available10, illegal foreign workers represent 3.5% of the workforce (OECD, 2004).
However, illegal immigrant work is a different concept from informal sector employment.
9In 2007, for example, 26% of employers were unregistered. This is not a large informal sector
compared to other developing economies. See ILO (2012) for a sample of countries where data for both
informal employment and informal sector employment is available. For comparison, in India the figures
are 83% and 67% respectively in non-agricultural activities, in Mexico: 54% and 34%.
10Neither the BLS nor the ILO have data on informal employment for the US, where it is generally
associated to work by illegal migrants (OECD, 2004). The share of the labor force without pension
contributions was 7.8% in 2003 (World Development Indicators).
8In Egypt, the share of informal wage workers in the private non-agricultural sector
is 81.5% (Abdelhamid & El Mahdi, 2003). Wahba (2009) finds11 that informal em-
ployment represented 76% of total private, non-agricultural waged employment in 2006
(80.5% in 1998). Of total micro and small enterprises, 82% are informal (El Mahdi,
2002; Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2003). Since small and micro enterprises contribute
to 77% of the jobs in the non-agricultural private sector12, we can reach a preliminary
estimation that informal sector employment represents 63% of total non-agricultural
private employment. In the baseline calibration of the model I conservatively target an
informal sector that accounts for 50% of the labor force.
1.3.3 Firm Level Data and Evidence
The firm level data was collected by teams supervised by Dr. Alia El Mahdi (Egypt),
Dr. Bachir Hamdouch (Morocco) and Dr. Semsa Ozar (Turkey), as part of a project
conducted by the Economic Research Forum (ERF): Promoting Competitiveness in Mi-
cro and Small Enterprises in the MENA Region (Middle East and Northern Africa). A
detailed description of the dataset and methodology for Turkey is found in Ozar (2006).
The database13 includes, for each country, information on approximately 5,000 micro
and small enterprises (less than 50 workers) in urban areas and covers all sectors except
agriculture.
Among the main activities at the four digit level (ISIC, 3rd Revision) in Turkey we
11Data from the Egypt Labor Market Surveys, carried out by the Economic Research Forum in
cooperation with CAPMAS. An even more conservative estimate for informal sector employment can
be computed considering only informal (no contract, no social security): self-employed, employers,
unpaid family workers, casual workers. This results in approximately 40% of the labor force 1998.
12In Egypt, to acquire a business licence it takes 372 days and 127 administrative steps passed before
50 public entities. Dissolution and settlement procedures take 25 bureaucratic steps during 244 days and
a cost equivalent to over 20 monthly salaries of a worker. A bankruptcy process takes 53 bureaucratic
steps, 653 days and the equivalent of well over 50 monthly salaries of a worker (Abdelhamid & El Mahdi,
2003). Given these obstacles, the size of the informal sector is hardly surprising.
13In the case of Turkey, the survey was designed so that the weighted results capture the actual
distribution of micro-small enterprises across sectors of activity, size, location and gender. The sampling
was national in coverage and chosen by stratified, multi-stage systematic sampling method by TurkStat.
On the basis of pre-test surveys and assessment of field experience, questions judged to be inaccurate
were modified or excluded. Several questions were identified to ensure the consistency among the
responses of the interviewees and participation in the survey was voluntary.
9observe: maintenance and repair of motor vehicles (5020, 14.9% of observations), other
retail in specialized stores (5239, 8.6%), restaurants, bars and canteens (5520, 7.7%),
retail sale of textiles, clothing, footwear and leather goods (5232, 6.7%), retail sale in
non-specialized stores with food, beverages or tobacco predominating (5211, 5.3%). Two
manufacturing activities enter the top ten sectors at the four digit levels: manufacturing
of wearing apparel, except fur apparel (1810, 2.6%) and manufacture of furniture (3610,
2.6%). In Egypt, retail sale of food, beverage and tobacco (5220, 26.9%) represents a
larger share of total observations and the top manufacturing industry is that of other
fabricated metal products (2899, 3.7%) at the seventh position, otherwise the group
of top ten activities is unchanged. In Morocco activities are classified in 44 categories
so that they are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, the main sectors are broadly
unchanged.
The status of a business, formal/informal, is defined according to compliance with
legal requirements: a formal firm has a licence, business registration and registration
with tax authorities and social security subscription.14 With this baseline definition
the share of informal firms is 36%, 71% and 24% for Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, re-
spectively (in this database). Different (more lax) definitions of informality were used
as a robustness check on the regressions below, with very similar results. The different
definitions of informal status are highly correlated as firms decide simultaneously on the
compliance with respect to different obligations (see for example Perry et al. Ch. 5,
2007).
Table 1.2 shows the probit estimates for informality (statistically insignificant vari-
ables are excluded depending on the country). The probability of informality status
is decreasing in education and work experience of the manager, age of the firm, the
number of workers, years of current management, the ratio of skilled workers, revenue
14For the ERF Egypt database, in particular, registration certificates were verified during the survey,
the results are similar across countries. In all cases surveys were voluntary, strictly confidential and
conducted by non-government organizations. As would be expected, there is evidence of very high
correlation between a firm’s registration status, its tax and social security contributions compliance in
other countries, as in Cata˜o et al. (2009), for example.
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per worker, and whether the manager is the owner of the firm. The probability of in-
formality status is increasing in the number of relatives of the manager working in the
firm and whether the entrepreneur was born in a rural area. In the case of Egypt, the
skill ratio is computed as male skilled workers over the total number of workers.
Table 1.2: Probit Estimates of Informality
database Turkey Egypt Morocco
workers -0.053∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗
working experience -0.011∗∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.004∗∗
years of educ. manager -0.039∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
firm age -0.025∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
firm age squared 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
years current management -0.007∗∗ − −
revenue/workers -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.009∗∗∗
skilled workers/total -0.201∗∗ -0.216∗∗ −
owner is manager -0.146∗∗ − −
number of relatives work 0.091∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ −
born rural 0.238∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ −
industry controls 2 dig. 2 dig. 44 categ.
geographic controls − govern. −
pseudo R2 0.10 0.19 0.13
n. observations 3821 4707 5051
Statistical significance: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Table 1.3 shows the results of OLS regression with log(capital-labor) ratios as the
dependent variable. Capital is defined as the book value of structures, buildings, tools,
equipment and inventories. Again, different definitions of informality were used with
similar results: for example defining informality simply as firms not registered with the
tax administration implied even larger coefficients of informality on the regressions of
the capital labor ratios. Regressions on revenue per worker as the dependent variable
also showed clear significant and negative coefficients of informality.15
15C.I. Jones offers a discussion of the challenges in estimating productivity, even though the literature
has found that revenue per worker and true measures of productivity tend to be correlated (in La
Porta & Shleifer, 2008). The general lack of book-keeping, recalling errors, volatility of production and
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Table 1.3: Regresions of Capital Labor Ratios (OLS)
database Turkey Egypt Morocco
informal -0.235∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗
working experience 0.006∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
years of educ. manager 0.056∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
years current management 0.010∗∗∗ − −
firm age 0.012∗∗∗ − −
skilled workers/total 0.265∗∗∗ − 0.165∗∗∗
log(revenue/workers) 0.431∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗
born rural -0.110∗∗ − -0.136∗∗∗
constant 13.57∗∗∗ 6.40∗∗∗ 7.82∗∗∗
industry controls 3 dig. 3 dig. 43 categ.
R2 0.34 0.30 0.46
n. observations 3788 4799 5048
Statistical significance: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
1.4 Model
The model builds upon the frameworks of occupational choice and industry equilibrium
of Lucas (1978) and Hopenhayn (1992). There is a continuum of individuals that face
the decision of being workers or entrepreneurs in every period. These individuals differ
in their ability as entrepreneurs but are homogeneous in terms of their productivity as
workers.
Entrepreneurs have access to a decreasing returns to scale technology and have the
option of conducting their business in the informal or formal sectors. The trade-off for
this decision is as follows: firms in the informal sector do not pay taxes and avoid the
fixed cost of registration and initial minimum capital requirement. However, the volume
fungibility of production inputs with household production make the estimation of productivity of small
informal sector firms particularly difficult. Regardless of this difficulty, crude measures of productivity
such as revenue per worker are negatively correlated with informality. The total factor productivity
(TFP) gap between formal and informal sector firms is approximately 150 percent for manufacturing
and 140 percent for services in Turkey (World Bank, 2010). As stressed in the literature, these differences
can be due to self-selection in addition to intrinsic characteristics of informal and formal sector firms.
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of their output determines the probability of detection by the authorities. If detected,
informal sector entrepreneurs have to pay the fixed cost of registration and enter the
formal sector, or lose their assets and become workers. There is a convex cost specific to
production in the informal sector, motivation for which is provided below. Formal sec-
tor entrepreneurs have access to external finance as determined by collateral constraints.
Time is discrete and the problem of individuals is dynamic: they are permitted to
accumulate financial wealth and may find optimal to start their enterprize in the infor-
mal sector until they reach a certain level of financial wealth and then register to operate
as a formal sector firm (a decision that will also depend on a transitory productivity
shock and permanent entrepreneurial ability). The analysis is restricted to the steady
state of a small open economy16 with no aggregate uncertainty.
1.4.1 Production Technology
Firms produce an homogeneous final good that serves as the numeraire. All firms have
access to a standard production technology with decreasing returns to scale, but they
differ in the entrepreneurial parameter ϕ, as given by the owner and manager of the
firm:17
q = ϕea f(k, l)γ with f(k, l) = kα (l + ψ)1−α (1)
where k is capital equipment, total labor input is the sum of hired labor l ≥ 0 and
the work of the entrepreneur18 ψ ∈ [0, 1], γ is the span-of-control parameter of Lucas
16Credit conditions in developing countries have been largely associated with exogenous factors such as
policy-controlled interest rates, liquidity conditions in international financial markets and intermediation
efficiency and market power in the financial sector (Cata˜o et al., 2009). Higher interest rates typically
observed in developing countries have been attributed to inefficient and uncompetitive financial markets
(Greenwood, Sanchez & Wang, 2013). The impact of higher interest rates will be evaluated as a
robustness exercise. Note that Midrigan & Xu (2013) find larger misallocation losses for a closed
economy relative to a small open economy in their model.
17This ability parameter is permanent and not determined by the fact that informal sector firms may
operate at a lower scale to avoid detection.
18This technology accounts for the labor input of managers in micro-firms, a segment that accommo-
dates a large part of the labor force in developing countries. Additionally, low financial assets do not
affect the possibility of exploiting this minimum level of labor input.
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(1978), which determines the returns to scale (strictly lower than one). In addition to
the differences in the permanent ability component, the firm is subject to productivity
shocks a, which follow a discrete state Markov process with transition density Λ(a′ | a),
where ea¯ = 1 results from the unconditional mean of a. This matrix is constructed as
a discrete representation of an AR(1) process. Individuals are indexed by state vari-
ables s = (ϕ, a, b), where b are financial assets, and z ∈ {w, i, f} denotes whether the
individual is a worker or an entrepreneur in the informal or formal sectors, respectively.
M(s, z) is the mass of individuals over the state (s, z).
1.4.2 Workers
Every period a mass of individuals is born19 and their entrepreneurial ability is drawn
from a density distribution h(ϕ). Individuals receive an endowment of financial assets
b (which can be thought of as bonds). The initial endowment of assets may correspond
to the redistribution of the financial wealth of individuals that die in any given period
or to an exogenously given (calibrated) value. The initial shock a is drawn from the
unconditional distribution derived from Λ(a′ | a).
Individuals value consumption of the final good through their lifetime20 utility
E0
∑∞
t=0(β (1 − δ))t u(ct), with period utility u(c) = c1−φ/(1 − φ), discount factor β
and probability δ that the individual dies in any period. An individual that dies is
immediately replaced by a newly born so that the mass of individuals remains constant.
Individuals choose whether to become workers, offering their labor services inelasti-
cally at a wage w per period or they may become entrepreneurs. As workers, individuals
are homogeneous and free to move between the informal and formal sectors, thus wages
19The case of infinitely lived individuals can be accommodated as will be clear below.
20It is standard in the literature to introduce concave utility in the problem of the entrepreneur (as
opposed to risk neutral, discounted expected profit evaluations). See, for example, Buera, Kaboski &
Shin (2011) and references therein contained. Given the focus of this paper on occupational choice and
the problem of small-firm entrepreneurs in developing countries this seems to be the relevant approach.
In Egypt approximately 92% of all enterprises have only one proprietor and firms with less than 10
workers account for well over 70% of employment.
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are the same for all workers.21 The problem of workers amounts to a savings decision,
written as the policy function b′ = gw(ϕ, a, b), and their occupation choice:
vw(ϕ, a, b) = max{c,b′≥0}
u(c) + β (1− δ)
∑
{a′}
Λ(a′ | a) v(ϕ, a′, b′) (2)
s.t. c+ b′ = w + (1 + r) b
The occupation choice is:
v(ϕ, a, b) = max{ vw(ϕ, a, b) , vi(ϕ, a, b) , vf (ϕ, a, b− ce − r b) } (3)
where f and i refer to the formal and informal sectors respectively, ce is the cost of
entering the formal sector (there are no fixed costs of entering the informal sector). To
register in the formal sector there is a minimum capital requirement condition, b ≥ b. I
assume that the worker is able to borrow this amount intra-period to satisfy this require-
ment, facing only its financial cost.22 We turn next to the problem of the entrepreneurs
in the formal and informal sectors.
1.4.3 Formal Sector Entrepreneurs
At the beginning of every period the entrepreneur relinquishes his financial wealth b to
a financial intermediary. This deposit earns a net interest rate r. Within the period the
entrepreneur is able to collateralize this deposit to make wage payments to hired labor
l(s, f) at wage w and obtain capital k(s, f). This collateral constraint restricts the level
of inputs used in any given period by w l + k ≤ λf b, where λf determines the extent
to which the formal sector entrepreneur is able to collateralize his financial wealth.23
21The evidence on whether labor markets are segmented between informal and formal sector firms
suggests mixed results at best. See the discussions in Maloney (2004), Pratap & Quintin (2008) and
Perry et al. (2007, Ch. 3). Wage inequality is outside the scope of this paper so human capital
considerations, among others, are ignored.
22Note that this particular assumption for modeling minimum capital requirements is relatively unbur-
densome. Barseghyan & DiCecio (2011), for example, include half of the minimum capital requirement
in total fixed costs even though, as they stress, these funds might be recoverable. In many countries it
is possible to withdraw minimum capital immediately after registration (Djankov, 2009). Results under
different specifications will be compared as a robustness exercise.
23This particular specification of collateral constraint was originally used in Midrigan & Xu (2010).
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At the end of the period the entrepreneur makes total factor payments (1 + r)w l for
hired labor input (including the interest rate cost) and (r + ν) k (which includes the
physical capital depreciation rate ν) and receives b (1 + r) from his deposit. We can de-
fine intratemporal debt as d = w l+k−b, which determines net interest rate payments.24
The entrepreneur also faces an intertemporal decision to save, the solution to which
is given by the optimal policy function b′ = gf (ϕ, a, b) ≥ 0. There are no costs of
adjustment for capital, so the endogenous state variable is given by assets b. The
dynamic program of this type of entrepreneur is written as:
vf (s) = max{c,l,k,b′≥0}
u(c) + β (1− δ)
∑
{a′}
Λ(a′ | a) max{ vf (s′) , vw(s′) } (4)
s.t. c+ b′ = (1− τ)pi(s, f) + (1 + r) b and w l + k ≤ λf b
with firm profits as follows (omitting s on the right hand side):
pi(s, f) = q − (1 + r)w l − (r + ν) k (5)
Entrepreneurs in the formal sector face taxes to profits τ .25 Capital depreciates at
a rate ν per period. An entrepreneur in the formal sector may choose to become a
worker, registration status is lost, but cannot switch directly into the informal sector.
The assumption β (1− δ) (1 + r) < 1 is required to allow the collateral constraints to be
quantitatively relevant.
1.4.4 Informal Sector Entrepreneurs
The specification of the collateral constraint for informal sector entrepreneurs is the
same as in the formal sector, but the extent to which they are able to collateralize their
financial wealth is lower, this is given by λi < λf (as a benchmark λi equals one).
24As will be clear below, in this setup there is no distinction between renting and owning capital. The
budget constraint, ignoring taxes, can also be written as c + b′ = q + (1 − ν) k + (1 + r) (b − w l − k),
where the entrepreneur carries financial wealth across periods.
25An alternative tax structure can be specified as a robustness exercise.
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The policy function b′ = gi(ϕ, a, b) ≥ 0 is the optimal solution to their savings
problem. The dynamic program for an informal sector entrepreneur is:
vi(s) = max{c,l,k,b′≥0}
u(c) + β (1− δ)
∑
{a′}
Λ(a′ | a) ( (1− κˆ) v(s′) + κˆ v(s′) )
s.t. c+ b′ = pi(s, i) + (1 + r) b and w l + k ≤ λi b (6)
where κˆ = min{κ q, 1} is the probability of being detected26 (increases continuously
with output). When detected, the entrepreneur is given the option to pay ce + r b and
register to the formal sector, or give up all assets to start again as a worker. If financial
assets b are not enough to cover registration costs, the entrepreneur has no choice but
to be a worker once again (an entrepreneur with no financial assets is not able to rent
capital for production):
v(ϕ, a′, b′) = max{ vf (ϕ, a′, b′ − ce − r b) , vw(ϕ, a′, 0) }
Profits for informal sector firms (omitting s on the right hand side) are:
pi(s, i) = q (1− ξ q)− (1 + r)w l − (r + ν) k (7)
where the cost of producing in the informal sector, in addition to input payments, is
given by ξ q2. This cost27 represents the inability to engage in legal contracts (increas-
ing transaction costs), bribes to corrupt officials, the cost of enforcing their property
rights when not protected by the government, worse access to infrastructure facilities
and services, lack of a fixed location, etc. (De Soto, 1989; Fortin et al., 1997; Levenson
& Maloney, 1998; Straub, 2005; Perry et al., 2007; World Bank, 2010). The specification
of this cost implies that it becomes increasingly important with size, an incentive for
26Alternatively, de Paula & Scheinkman (2011) opt for a probability that depends on the capital stock
of the firm, equal to zero below a particular threshold, with a discrete jump to one afterwards (in a
static framework).
27De Soto (1989) very graphically describes a number of practices followed by informal sector en-
trepreneurs in Peru to avoid detection and punishment by the authorities as well as other costs of
informality: dispersion of employees among a number of smaller and less visible workplaces, avoidance
of advertising of goods and services, lack of enforcement of commercial contracts, bribes to corrupt of-
ficials (10-15% of gross income compared to 1% paid by formal small business), lack of access to letters
of credits or warrants. See also Perry et al. Ch. 5 (2007) for further evidence.
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informal sector firms to either operate at a suboptimal scale or to register in the formal
sector.
The timing is simple: the entrepreneur first makes production and savings decisions.
At the end of the period the firm may be detected by the government, in this case the
entrepreneur starts the following period in the formal sector, after paying the costs of
registration, or goes back to being a worker. Informal sector firms have the option to
register and operate in the formal sector at the beginning of every period after observing
their shock a. This decision will depend on the productivity shock, permanent ability
and assets of the entrepreneur.
1.4.5 Aggregation
The state space is given by (ϕ, a, b, z) ∈ Sϕ×Sa×Sb×Z, where Sϕ = [1,∞), Sb = [0,∞),
Z = {w, i, f}, a ∈ Sa takes on a finite number of values. Let M : Sϕ×Sa×Sb×Z → R+
denote the measure of individuals over the state space and M be the total measure of
individuals. A mass of individuals is born every period (equal to the mass of individuals
that die) and draw entrepreneurial ability ϕ from a density function h(ϕ). The labor
market clearing condition is given by:
∑
z∈{i,f}
(∫
l(s, z)M(s, z) ds
)
=
∫
M(s, w) ds (7)
Total output in this economy is:
Q =
∑
z∈{i,f}
(∫
q(s, z) (1− ξz q(s, z))M(s, z) ds
)
(8)
where ξi = ξ and ξf = 0.
Government revenues are destined to projects that do not affect the production
technology or utility of individuals.
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1.4.6 Equilibrium
Given government policies ( τ, ce, κ, b ) and interest rate r, a small-open economy sta-
tionary competitive equilibrium consists of:
• quantities {q(s, z)}z∈{i,f} and production inputs {l(s, z), k(s, z)}z∈{i,f},
• savings functions {gz(s)}z∈{i,f,w},
• wage w, values {v(s), vi(s), vf (s), vw(s)}, profits {pi(s, z)}z∈{i,f},
• invariant measure M(s, z),
such that:
• workers solve (2), formal sector entrepreneurs solve (4) and informal sector en-
trepreneurs solve (6),
• market clearing condition for labor (7) holds, the proceeds from taxation are
dissipated,
• the measureM(s, z) is consistent with workers and entrepreneurs’ policy functions,
optimal decision rules and detection probabilities.
1.5 Firm Dynamics and Misallocation
Occupational choice is depicted as in Fig. 1.1 below. This graphs the occupation
decision function for a worker:
v(ϕ, a, b) = max{ vw(ϕ, a, b) , vi(ϕ, a, b) , vf (ϕ, a, b− ce − r b) }
where the value of the idiosyncratic productivity shock is fixed at its unconditional av-
erage ea = 1. Individuals with relatively low entrepreneurial ability ϕ and low assets
decide to become workers. Those with high enough entrepreneurial ability choose to
run a firm depending on the level of assets. Entrepreneurs may opt to start in the
informal sector and eventually transition to the formal sector. On average more able
entrepreneurs will move earlier to the formal sector or even start with a formal sec-
tor firm (this can occur for high idiosyncratic productivity shocks). More productive
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entrepreneurs are the ones likely to expand and benefit from a formal-status (see Fa-
jnzylber et al., 2011).
The quantitative exercise will compare a relatively undistorted economy, the US,
with two economies with moderate and large informal sectors, Turkey and Egypt re-
spectively. It will be useful however to define misallocation against an efficient bench-
mark (defined in terms of a social planner’s problem). The three economies will exhibit
efficiency losses against this benchmark, so that the quantitative results are relevant if
the model can account for an important part of the differences in Turkey and Egypt
with respect to the US.
Productive efficiency implies equal marginal productivity of both capital and la-
bor across firms. For formal sector firms the first order condition for hired labor is
(abstracting from taxes and assuming an interior solution for hired labor l > 0):
ql = (1 + r + µ(s, f))w
where µ(s, f) is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint. This is a static
decision as only current period variables are relevant. Collateral constraints can gen-
erate dispersion in marginal productivity,28 to the extent that the entrepreneurs are
borrowing constrained and there is dispersion in µ(s, f) (due to different shocks and
assets). The argument is similar for capital.
28The discussion of misallocation generated by financial frictions in this section borrows from Midrigan
& Xu (2010).
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Figure 1.1: Occupation Choice
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In the case of informal sector firms, input decisions are distorted by the marginal cost
of production ξ as well as by the probability of being detected by the government (when
considering tax enforcement). The choices of inputs are no longer static, assuming
differentiability for the sake of the argument and omitting unnecessary notation and
taxes, the labor input decision would be derived from (for capital the argument is
identical):
uc pil + β (1− δ)
∑
{a′}
Λ(a′ | a) κˆl
(
v(s′)− v(s′)) = µ(s, i)
Government enforcement implies an additional distortion: entrepreneurs limit their
output to avoid government detection. Collateral constraints continue to play a role
in generating dispersion in the marginal productivity of inputs. The lower bound of
labor input for the firm l + ψ ≥ ψ, with l ≥ 0, may also imply a deviation from equal
marginal productivity for all firms, that may be quantitatively relevant in economies
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where a large share of the labor force is self-employed (corner solution). Finally, we
need to consider a general equilibrium effect (as in Lucas, 1978): in economies where
λf is lower there will be lower capital accumulation and lower wages, more people will
turn to entrepreneurship (or self employment). In the margin, these entrepreneurs have
lower managerial ability.
1.6 Parameters & Taxes
The parameters of the model are divided into three sets. A first set of, mostly standard,
parameters is predetermined. Following the literature on misallocation, a second set of
parameters is calibrated to match key economic aspects of the US, a relatively undis-
torted economy. Finally, country specific institutional parameters, related to taxes and
registration costs as well as the enforcement of financial contracts are specified.
1.6.1 Predetermined and Benchmark Parameters
The parameters taken from the literature are enumerated in Table 1.4. A period in the
model represents a year, β(1−δ) is the effective discount factor (δ is calibrated below), r
is the risk free interest rate, φ governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Buera
et al., 2011), ν is the capital depreciation rate (Barseghyan & DiCecio, 2011; Restuccia
& Rogerson, 2008). Production parameters α and γ are also taken from Restuccia &
Rogerson (2008). As a benchmark, ψ is set so that the entrepreneur can fully exploit
his effective units of labor.29
The idiosyncratic shock a follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation coefficient
ρ with innovations that have a standard deviation of σ. Asker et al. (2012) estimate
the productivity process of firms for a large set of emerging economies using different
data sets. I take the median of the cross-country estimates for each parameter.30 These
29For an alternative specification, see Gollin (2008).
30This results in an autocorrelation parameter practically equivalent to that of D’Erasmo & Moscoso-
Boedo (2012), whereas their standard deviation parameter is 0.23, estimated for the US manufacturing
sector.
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values are quantitatively critical to evaluate the impact of frictions on aggregate TFP,
as established by Asker et al. (2012) and Buera & Shin (2011). Further discussion and
an analysis of the impact of alternative parameterizations is carried out below.
Table 1.4: Predetermined and Benchmark Parameters
par. value description
α 1/3 income share of capital
γ 0.85 span-of-control (decr. returns to scale)
ψ 1.00 entrepreneurs’ labor input
ν 0.08 capital depreciation rate
φ 1.50 intertemporal elasticity of substitution
β (1− δ) 0.92 effective discount factor
r 0.04 risk free interest rate
ρ 0.85 autocorrelation coefficient
σ 0.38 standard deviation of shocks
δ 0.085 exogenous annual exit rate
µh -1.795 ability dist. (scaled log-normal)
σh 0.83 ability dist. (scaled log-normal)
We turn next to the calibrated parameters in Table 1.4. The exogenous annual exit
rate for establishments δ is set to match a total exit rate of 0.10 (Restuccia & Rogerson,
2008). In the model, the total exit rate is determined by the endogenous exit of firms
in addition to the stochastic exit shock given by δ. The literature has additionally con-
sidered the role of per-period fixed costs of production which affects endogenous exit of
firms.
The individual’s permanent entrepreneurial ability is drawn from a log-normal dis-
tribution h(ϕ) with parameters µh and σh. The distribution is scaled by setting the
minimum value of ϕ equal to one.31 These parameters target the US distribution of
employment by firm size32 (Helfand et al., 2007), see Table 1.5.
31This is convenient for comparisons with the Pareto distribution (not reported).
32The Appendix compares the size distribution of firms according to different sources.
23
Table 1.5: US Distribution of Employment and Firms by Size Class
% employment 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-499 500-999 1,000+
US - data† 11.45 7.70 11.08 8.43 17.89 6.91 36.55
US - model 10.02 8.55 9.42 8.86 18.04 8.19 36.92
% firms 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-499 500-999 1,000+
US - data 74.27 12.56 8.06 2.69 2.00 0.22 0.20
US - model 66.89 17.18 8.99 3.75 2.51 0.35 0.33
†Helfand et al. (2007), average 1995-2000.
1.6.2 Institutional and Country-Specific Parameters
The data for the size of the informal sector was discussed previously. The informal sec-
tor includes the workers as well as the entrepreneurs in the informal sector as a share of
the labor force. Parameter ξ is set conservatively to match a 1/2 share of employment
in the informal sector in Egypt and κ is initially set to zero (the role of enforcement will
be discussed in additional policy exercises). For Turkey, ξ targets an informal sector
share of employment of 0.2. For the benchmark US economy, we consider no informal
sector.
The collateral constraint for the formal sector λf targets the ratios of loans by finan-
cial institutions to the private sector plus the private bond market capitalization over
GDP (data is from Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Levine, 2009), which is a typical target
in the literature (see for example Quintin, 2008). This ratio is 2.3, 0.15 and 0.32 for
the US, Turkey and Egypt, respectively. For the informal sector, λi is initially set so
that entrepreneurs must self-finance their activities (see, among many others, El-Mahdi,
2002; Amaral & Quintin, 2006; Perry et al., 2007).
Registration costs ce are from Djankov et al. (2002). They compute the direct
official costs of procedures plus the monetized value of the entrepreneur’s time (as a
fraction of GDP per capita in 1999) associated with meeting legal requirements that a
start-up must bear in order to operate legally. Minimum capital requirements are from
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the World Bank’s Doing Business Report (2004), also expressed in terms of GDP per
capita.33
Table 1.6: Institutional and Country-Specific Parameters
par. US Turkey Egypt type of tax
λf 45 1.16 1.50 collateral formal sector
λi − 1.00 1.00 collateral informal sector
ξ − 0.1110 0.0034 informal sector specific cost
τ 0.46 0.53 0.54 total tax rate as % of profits
ce 0.02 0.37 1.17 registration costs plus time value
‡
b 0.00 0.13 7.88 minimum capital requirements‡
‡expressed in terms of GDP per capita.
We consider a simple tax structure where τ (computed by the World Bank Doing
Business Survey) includes taxes paid by a standardized limited liability company ex-
pressed as a share of commercial profits (after accounting for allowable deductions and
exemptions). The taxes are measured at all levels of government and include profit
or corporate income tax, social security contributions and labor taxes paid by the em-
ployer, property taxes, dividend and capital gains tax, etc. Taxes withheld (sales tax
or value added tax) but not paid by the company are excluded. A more complete tax
structure is discussed in the Appendix.
1.7 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I discuss the baseline quantitative results. I then conduct a robustness
exercise with respect to the autocorrelation parameter of the idiosyncratic productivity
process, which has been shown to be important for the impact of financial frictions
on misallocation as discussed below. I also discuss further robustness exercises to be
33Barseghyan & DiCecio (2011) consider a broader definition of entry barriers which include legal fees
of construction permits, utility connections and inspections associated with building a physical location
in which to operate a firm as well as minimum capital requirements. In this sense, the figures used here
may be considered a lower bound of these costs.
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conducted in the future.
1.7.1 Baseline Results
Table 1.7 shows the baseline quantitative results. Total factor productivity is defined
as Solow’s residual from the equation Q = AKα L1−α, where L is the total workforce.
For the benchmark calibration, total TFP drops by 28% in Egypt relative to the US,
in the informal sector TFP is 14% lower than in the formal sector. The drop of total
TFP in Turkey is 33%, larger than for Egypt due to lower access to credit (the entry
cost and the total tax rate are lower than in Egypt). Additionally there are large drops
in wages, output per worker and the average size of firms (mostly due to the small size
of firms in the informal sector).
Table 1.7: Baseline Results
variable US Egypt Turkey
private credit/total output 2.36 0.31 0.20
share of informal sector labor n.a. 0.50 0.18
capital/labor total 1.00 0.17 0.10
wage 1.00 0.32 0.24
output per worker total 1.00 0.40 0.31
output per worker informal n.a. 0.37 0.18
TFP total 1.00 0.72 0.67
TFP informal sector n.a. 0.66 0.46
TFP formal sector 1.00 0.77 0.72
total capital/output 2.03 0.86 0.65
capital/output formal sector 2.03 0.79 0.63
capital/output informal sector n.a. 0.94 0.64
avg. firm size total∗ 40.6 3.6 4.2
avg. firm size informal n.a. 1.7 1.0
firm exit rate 0.10 0.19 0.18
∗average firm size in workers includes entrepreneur.
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1.7.2 Robustness Exercise
I reduce the persistence parameter for the idiosyncratic productivity shock from 0.85
to 0.75. This is within the range of 0.6 to 0.8 suggested by Syverson (2011) for the US.
The distribution of entrepreneurial ability is re-calibrated for the US. As discussed in
Buera & Shin (2011), with collateral constraints, a reduction in shock persistence leads
worse allocation of production factors through entrepreneur’s self-financing.
Table 1.8: Robustness Results
variable US Egypt
private credit/total output 2.34 0.32
share of informal sector labor n.a. 0.52
capital/labor total 1.00 0.15
wage 1.00 0.29
output per worker total 1.00 0.36
output per worker informal n.a. 0.31
TFP total 1.00 0.66
TFP informal sector n.a. 0.57
TFP formal sector 1.00 0.76
total capital/output 2.01 0.86
capital/output formal sector 2.01 0.72
capital/output informal sector n.a. 1.03
avg. firm size total∗ 31.8 2.06
avg. firm size informal n.a. 1.07
firm exit rate 0.10 0.32
∗average firm size in workers includes entrepreneur.
1.8 Policy & Reforms
This section discusses three policy/reform experiments for Egypt (all relative to the
baseline calibration): (1) the elimination of registration costs, (2) an improvement in
access to credit that increases the ratio of total credit to output from 0.32 to 0.40, (3)
government enforcement of registration for informal sector firms.
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1.8.1 Elimination of Registration Costs
The simplification of entry regulation has become a popular reform. This has been
attributed, at least in part, to the inclusion of business entry indicators in the World
Bank’s Doing Business Project: in 2003-2008 193 reforms took place in 116 countries
(Djankov, 2009). These reforms include standardizing documents and reducing mini-
mum capital requirements, registration costs or bureaucratic steps required to complete
the registration process. Empirical cross-country studies suggest that reducing regis-
trations costs can have a large impact on productivity (see the discussion in Djankov,
2009). In the theoretical literature, Antunes & Cavalcanti (2007) find that for a devel-
oping country like Peru, the size of the informal sector is equally accounted for by low
financial contract enforcement and high regulation costs. Barseghyan & DiCecio (2011),
in a model without financial frictions or the informal sector, find that countries in the
lowest decile of the entry costs distribution have 1.32 to 1.45 times higher TFP and 1.52
to 1.75 times higher output per worker than countries in the highest decile. Empirical
country-case studies, on the other hand, have found a modest impact resulting from
reforms that reduce the cost of entering the formal sector.
Several studies have exploited micro-level data to analyze the impact of reducing
registration costs for specific countries. Fajnzylber et al. (2011) and Monteiro et al.
(2012) evaluate the impact of a program of bureaucracy simplification and tax reduc-
tion for micro-enterprises in Brazil, the SIMPLES program. Monteiro et al. (2013)
document an increase of 13 percentage points in formal licensing among retail firms
created after the program. They find heterogeneous impact across industries, given
that requirements to enter and operate in the formal sector differ according to economic
activity. More specifically, they find no impact on construction, services and manufac-
turing sectors. Fajnzylber et al. (2011), in addition to a modest impact on registration,
document that firms born under the SIMPLES program show higher levels of revenue
and profits, suggesting the adoption of technologies and lines of business that are more
permanent, capital intensive and of a larger scale, as measured by number of employees.
Kaplan et al. (2011) estimate the effect of simplification of firm registration procedures
on business start-ups in Mexico. They suggest that attention in business deregulation
may have been overemphasized given the small increase in new start-ups and conclude
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that the small benefits of being formal may explain the low impact of the implemented
reforms. Bruhn (2012) also examines the case of Mexico and estimates a small impact
on registration.
The third column in Table 1.9 shows the results for Egypt, of a complete elimi-
nation of registration costs: ce + rb = 0. Employment in the informal sector falls by
1 percentage point, the impact on productivity, the average size of firms and capital
accumulation are negligible or non-existent.
Table 1.9: Reforms
baseline reforms
variable US Egypt Egypt1 Egypt2 Egypt3
private credit/total output 2.36 0.32 0.32 0.40 0.35
share of informal sector labor n.a. 0.50 0.49 0.46 0.48
capital/labor total 1.00 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.13
wage 1.00 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.28
output per worker total 1.00 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.36
output per worker informal n.a. 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.33
TFP total 1.00 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.69
TFP informal sector n.a. 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.67
TFP formal sector 1.00 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.73
total capital/output 2.03 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.74
capital/output formal sector 2.03 0.79 0.79 0.85 0.79
capital/output informal sector n.a. 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.70
avg. firm size total∗ 40.6 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.2
avg. firm size informal n.a. 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.3
firm exit rate 0.10 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20
∗average firm size in workers includes entrepreneur.
1elimination of registration cost (ce + r b = 0).
2improvement in access to credit (λf = 1.75).
3increase in govt. enforcement (κ = 0.0002).
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1.8.2 Financial Sector Reform
The exercise consists in increasing the access to credit for formal sector firms so that
private credit over total output increases from 0.32 to 0.40, which implies incrementing
λf = 1.75. The wage level increases by 6% relative to the benchmark result and output
per worker increases by 5%. The size of the informal sector drops from 50% of workers
to 46%.
1.8.3 Government Enforcement of Registration
We now turn to government enforcement of registration. One example of a technology
that can lead to an increase in enforcement is the use of data matching techniques applied
in developed economies (UK National Audit Office, 2008): tax records are matched with
external sources of information to identify taxpayers with income streams that have not
been declared. Simple inspections and audits are more direct methods of enforcement.
In developed economies sanctions range from financial penalties, closure of business,
initiation of bankruptcy, criminal prosecution, etc. There are also significant differ-
ences in the effectiveness of the judicial systems across countries in terms of prosecuting
evaders34.
The role of government enforcement is discussed in policy circles (World Bank, 2010)
as well as in the private sector. A study by McKinsey Global Institute (2006) proposes
that better enforcement of tax and business regulation would allow to reduce taxes en-
couraging more companies to join the formal economy in developing countries35. In the
UK there are 1.6 tax employees per 1,000 of population, compared to less than 0.03 for
countries like Turkey, India and Brazil. Fines for unreported value added taxes can be
as high as 3 times the amount of tax evaded and/or up to 6 months in prison in the
UK. In Turkey, fines for valued added tax evasion are negligible.
There is, however, little work on understanding the impact of increased enforcement
34See Tax Administration in OECD and Selected Non-OECD Countries: Comparative Information
Series.
35In this study the reduction of registration costs is also proposed.
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in developing economies. Almeida & Carneiro (2009) study firm level data for Brazil,
and find that stricter enforcement of labor regulation constrains firm size and leads to
higher unemployment. In general it is not clear that the optimum size of the informal
sector is zero. Prado (2011) builds a model where the determinants of the size of the
informal sector are taxation, government enforcement and formal sector entry costs. He
finds that stricter enforcement does not always imply an economic improvement; under
particular contexts countries can benefit from a larger informal sector. Leal-Ordon˜ez
(2013) finds that better enforcement increases output when the informal sector is small
but the opposite happens when it is large. I extend this exercise to an environment
with firm dynamics and financial constraints.
In the exercise conducted here, we consider a probability of detection by the govern-
ment that is increasing in output of the informal sector firm36. In the case of detection,
the entrepreneur is forced to pay the registration cost and enter the formal sector in
the following period. If the entrepreneur does not have sufficient wealth to pay this
registration cost, all financial assets are lost and enters the next period as a worker.
The results from this exercise show that although this policy can be successful in
reducing the size of the informal sector, it does so at the expense of creating a new
distortion in the economy with a large negative impact. The size of the informal sector
falls from 50 to 48% of the total workforce, the wage falls by 12.5% and aggregate output
per worker is reduced by 10% while aggregate TFP drops by 4%.
1.9 Conclusion
The size of the informal sector is determined by the access to credit in the formal sector,
the burden of taxes and registration costs. I find that for a country like Egypt37, where
36I assume that enforcement is costless. Given that my results are that enforcement is negative in
terms of welfare and productivity, considering the additional costs of implementing an enforcement
technology would increase the losses. Considering a detection technology that depends only on capital
would distort the capital/labor ratio and potentially increase misallocation in the informal sector.
37The informal sector is large in many developing economies (ILO, 2012) such as, for example, Pakistan
(73%), Philippines (72%), India (68%), Colombia (52%), Peru (49%).
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the informal sector accounts for a sizable part of the workforce, aggregate TFP losses
associated with these frictions are larger than 28% and wages can be approximately
70% lower than in a financially developed economy like the US.
Given the productivity losses associated with the informal sector, the amount of
effort dedicated to policies intended to ameliorate these losses is not surprising. The
simplification of entry regulation has become a popular reform: in the period 2003-2008
193 reforms took place in 116 countries (Djankov, 2009). According to the World Bank’s
Doing Business Survey, Egypt was a top reformer for 2006-2007, this was the second
time in 5 years that Egypt was among the top reformers in the world. The reforms
included simplifications in the process of starting a business, increased access to credit,
easing of the tax burden and minimum capital requirements and registrations costs. I
find that the impact of completely eliminating registration costs is small (relative to the
gap in different variables between the US and Egypt). This is consistent with empirical
country-case studies that exploit firm-level data to evaluate the consequences of these
reforms.
I also evaluate the effects of increasing enforcement of registration for informal sector
firms. In this case, I find that the consequences are negative: aggregate TFP drops,
as well as wages and output per capital. This can explain why countries don’t pursue
this type of strategy, in spite of suggestions in policy circles and the corporate sector38.
From this exercises we can conclude that the only relevant strategy to reduce the size
of the informal sector is improving the business environment in the formal sector.
I have abstracted from the interaction with technology accumulation39 and human
capital. Additionally, given that different industries are more dependent on external fi-
nance40, there could be important interactions between the economic structure in terms
of different industries and the informal sector.
38Note however that, from this type of policy, formal sector firms would benefit from lower wages.
39I explore the role of the endogenous accumulation of firm productivity in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
40Cata˜o et al. (2009) quantify the impact of financial deepening on employment formalization rates
in Brazil, finding that results that are more pronounced in industries with higher financial dependence.
Chapter 2
From Firm Productivity
Dynamics to Aggregate Efficiency
2.1 Introduction
Differences in total factor productivity (TFP) largely account for cross country dif-
ferences in output per capita (Parente & Prescott, 2000; Caselli, 2005): controlling
for different amounts of production inputs such as labor, human and physical capital,
some countries are able to produce more goods and services than others. The empirical
literature has documented that misallocation in developing economies can explain an
important part of cross-country differences in TFP: in these economies there is more
dispersion in the marginal productivity of inputs of production than in more advanced
economies (all related literature is discussed below). This means that with the same
total amount of inputs of production we could increase output by shifting resources
from firms with low marginal productivity to those with higher marginal productivity.
The underdevelopment of financial markets has naturally been proposed as a source
of misallocation: the lack of access to credit constrains firms from reaching the optimal
level of capital. This implies that constrained firms with different levels of financial
assets will have different marginal productivity of capital. However, recent work by
Midrigan & Xu (2013) has pointed out that the misallocation losses generated by finan-
cial underdevelopment are modest in a quantitative calibrated framework. They find
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that in a country with no credit markets the losses are approximately 5% of TFP in
their benchmark specification.1
I revisit this result by considering a model with financial constraints where firms are
able to invest every period in order to increase their productivity (knowledge capital). I
find that this channel amplifies the effect of financial constraints on misallocation. For
Mexico, the model without endogenous firm-productivity accumulation generates misal-
location losses of 7.3% in TFP, but this increases to 14.7% in a model with endogenous
firm-productivity accumulation.
The amplification result is derived in part from a stronger covariance between firm
productivity (which is endogenous in the model with knowledge capital) and output
capital ratios (higher for more constrained firms). In the model without knowledge
capital, due to the fact that shocks are purely mean-reverting, a firm that is highly con-
strained in one period is likely to be less constrained in the following period. In a model
with knowledge capital, a firm that is constrained in one period can again be highly
constrained in the following period if the endogenous productivity component increases.2
Financial constraints also have dynamic consequences by affecting firm productivity
accumulation: constrained entrepreneurs invest less in knowledge capital (firm produc-
tivity), establishing a link between firm productivity dynamics and aggregate production
efficiency.3 Previous work in development and financial frictions has mostly ignored the
role of endogenous productivity growth of the firm or considered a one-time technolog-
ical adoption choice (an exception is the recent work of Cole, Greenwood & Sanchez,
2012). The empirical literature has already stressed the relative lack of growth of firms in
1To be more specific, they show that although financial constraints can have important quantitative
effects on TFP, the impact is not generated through the misallocation channel. They also consider a
one-time technology adoption decision without uncertainty, which can increase misallocation to 6.3% of
TFP.
2In a different context, the role of the correlation of distortions with firm productivity was emphasized
by Restuccia & Rogerson (2008). Hopenhayn (2012) discusses the specific conditions under which
correlated distortions can generate a larger impact on TFP.
3The theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between financial development and
economic growth underscores the role of better functioning financial systems in easing the external
financing constraints that impede firm growth and innovation (Beck & Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, 2006) and
aggregate growth (Levine, 2005).
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developing countries (for example Hsieh & Klenow, 2012). The model with endogenous
productivity accumulation can partially account for the lower life-cycle productivity
growth of firms in an economy with underdeveloped financial markets.
How do financial constraints affect firm productivity growth? Investment in inno-
vation is a costly and uncertain enterprize. As the capacity to obtain external funds is
diminished, resources allocated to this effort will be reduced due to different mechanisms
at work. First, the return of this investment in the case of success may be diminished
by the inability to quickly increase production capacity if the credit necessary to do
so is scarce (i.e., if entrepreneurs cannot rent the optimal level of physical capital due
to insufficient collateral). Second, financial constraints reduce profits obtained by en-
trepreneurs and therefore the amount of assets they are able to accumulate in every
period. This will affect the amount of resources invested in new technologies.4
The empirical literature finds that innovation increases productivity and is therefore
crucial for firm performance, whereas the lack of access to external finance constraints
innovation and firm productivity growth and therefore reduces aggregate production ef-
ficiency.5 Several studies have exploited cross-country firm-level data to analyze the role
of financial constraints in determining innovation. Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer (2013)
use the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), covering
a wide array of sectors and countries with direct measures of innovation and financial
constraints. They conclude that financial constraints restrain the ability of domesti-
cally owned firms to innovate and thus to reach the technological frontier. Financial
constraints are most detrimental for smaller and younger firms. They also document
that financial restrictions at the firm level are strongly negatively correlated with ag-
gregate measures of productivity as well as firm level TFP. In related work, Ayyagari,
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Maksimovic (2007), also find evidence that access to finance is an
4A simple stylized model will illustrate these mechanisms.
5For survey-type treatments of the evidence of the positive impact of innovation on firm productivity
and size-growth see Hall (2011) and Hall, Mairesse & Mohnen (2010). Although not without challenges,
in this empirical literature innovation includes expenditures related to the introduction of new produc-
tion processes, design and technical specifications, the implementation of new or significantly improved
products (goods or services), new organizational methods in business practices, adoption and adaptation
of existing technologies (Hall, 2011; Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer, 2013).
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important determinant of innovation within a firm. Dabla-Norris, Kersting & Verdier
(2010) find that innovation has a stronger effect on productivity in financially developed
countries.
Additionally, financially underdeveloped economies will be characterized by a lower
average ability of entrepreneurs, many of which have relatively low prospects of gen-
erating productivity growth through innovation. This logic does not assume that the
pool of entrepreneurs is worse in some countries than others, but rather, due to the
lower demand for workers and the lower wages they receive, a larger mass of individuals
opt to set up firms or become self-employed. These individuals, in the margin, tend
to have lower ability to manage a firm and less incentives to invest in increasing firm
productivity. This is exacerbated in developing countries by the existence of a large
informal sector. This refers to entrepreneurs that do not register their firm in order to
evade their tax obligations but have no access to credit (formal credit requires documen-
tation). In developing economies a large part of the labor force belongs to small-scale,
low-productivity and low-growth firms in this sector.6 The informal sector needs to be
included in a quantitative framework to avoid possible bias in the results. For example,
establishment-level data covers formal sector firms (and this is the focus of the quan-
titative results from the model). However, entrepreneurs may start their operations
in the informal sector until a sufficient amount of assets is obtained to outgrow finan-
cial constraints and are able to reach an optimal level of production in the formal sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 (S.2.2) overviews the re-
lated literature, S.2.3 provides the empirical motivation of this paper, S.2.4. discusses
a stylized model of innovation and financial constraints, S.2.5 presents the quantitative
framework, S.2.6 discusses the calibration of the model, S.2.7 presents the main results
of the model, S.2.8 concludes.
6In the quantitative framework the informal sector is modeled to account for these facts, but all
TFP and misallocation computations refer to formal sector firms. Employment in the informal sector
is an enterprise-based concept and covers persons working in units that have informal characteristics in
relation to, e.g., the legal status, registration, size, the registration of the employees, their bookkeeping
practices, etc. (ILO).
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2.2 Relation to the Literature
This paper builds upon several strands of the development and macroeconomics litera-
ture, a brief overview follows.
Misallocation. This literature refers to the large dispersion of marginal produc-
tivity of inputs observed across firms in a developing country, within narrowly defined
industries. This finding suggests that great gains in aggregate output can potentially be
generated by shifting production inputs from low marginal productivity firms to those
with higher productivity. Hsieh & Klenow (2009), for example, find that gaps in the
marginal products of labor and capital across plants can explain a large part of the dif-
ferences in manufacturing TFP between China and India compared to the US. Busso,
Fazio & Levy (2012) and Hsieh & Klenow (2012) perform similar empirical exercises
for Mexico and Mexico-India, respectively. Busso, Madrigal & Pages (2012) compile
evidence for 10 Latin American economies.
In terms of theoretical work, Restuccia & Rogerson (2008) analyze the potential
quantitative effects of idiosyncratic tax schemes, suggesting the importance of evalu-
ating specific distortions that affect the allocation of resources across firms. Financial
frictions have been extensively studied in the development and firm dynamics litera-
ture; for recent quantitative examples see Amaral & Quintin (2010), Buera, Kaboski &
Shin (2011), Arellano, Bai & Zhang (2012), Greenwood, Sanchez & Wang (2013) and
Steinberg (2013), among many others. My main contribution relative to this literature
is to analyze the implications of considering the life-cycle productivity growth of firms
and its interaction with financial frictions.
Bhattacharya, Guner & Ventura (2013) introduce non-stochastic accumulation of
managerial skills (which determines firm productivity), while Gabler & Poschke (2013)
allow firms to allocate resources to probabilistic experimentation, which in the case of
success can lead to an increase in firm productivity. These authors evaluate the effects
of distortions in the form of idiosyncratic taxes along the lines of Restuccia & Rogerson
(2008). They show that assuming an exogenous distribution of firm productivity can
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lead to the underestimation of the consequences of distortions that affect the allocation
of resources across production units.
Knowledge Capital. Different theories have linked the life-cycle growth of firms
(or establishments) to the stochastic accumulation of knowledge specific to the produc-
tion unit (Klette & Kortum, 2004; Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005). The theoretical framework
analyzed here builds on that research. Doraszelski & Jaumandreu (2013) show that
by introducing uncertainty in innovation they “(...) allow shocks to accumulate over
time, even firms with the same time path of R&D expenditures may not have the same
productivity.” They evaluate their model relative to the non-stochastic model of knowl-
edge capital using a panel of manufacturing firms and find that a stochastic framework
is favored by the data.
There is also research that emphasizes the role of intangible capital incorporated
in the macro-neoclassical framework, such as Parente & Prescott (2000), McGrattan
& Prescott (2005), Corrado, Hulten & Sichel (2009). This literature stresses the need
to consider investment in intangibles such as software, R&D, as well as investments in
building organizations to address many relevant questions in macroeconomics. Total
business investment in intangibles has been found to be the dominant source of growth
in labor productivity for the US (Corrado et al., 2009).
Informal Sector. There is a literature that analyzes the determinants of the size
of the informal sector and its impact on aggregate outcomes as TFP and the size and
productivity distribution of firms. Several results can be considered standard: the size
of the informal sector decreases as the enforcement of financial contracts improves in
the formal sector (Quintin, 2008; D’Erasmo & Moscoso-Boedo, 2012), increases with
labor-market restrictions, heavier regulation of entry (for registered firms) and the tax
burden of the formal sector and decreases with enforcement of legal obligations (Djankov
et al., 2002; Perry et al., 2007; Leal Ordon˜ez, 2013). At the firm level, compliance with
regulation is associated with better access to external finance, while informal sector
firms are found to be less capital and skilled-labor intensive, less productive, smaller
and younger (Amaral & Quintin, 2006; Perry et al., 2007; Busso et al., 2012). For a
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more thorough discussion of the informal sector, see Chapter 1 of this thesis.
2.3 Empirical Motivation
After a brief description of the data, this section documents the empirical evidence that
motivates this study.7 Relative to what has been documented for the US we can sum-
marize the empirical facts for Colombia and Mexico as follows: (1) establishments grow
less in terms of employment and productivity, (2) there is a larger share of employment
in smaller establishments, (3) small establishments in the informal sector account for a
large share of employment.
2.3.1 Data Description
For Colombia, the data is from the Annual Manufacturers Survey (AMS) for the period
1982-1998, constructed through a project of technical cooperation between the national
statistics agency (DANE) and J. Haltiwanger (see Eslava et al., 2004). The AMS con-
sists of an unbalanced panel of plants8 with more than 10 employees or sales above a
certain limit (approximately 35 thousand US dollars in 1998). The data-set includes
information for each plant on output value and prices, input costs and prices, energy
consumption in units and prices, number of production and non-production workers,
book value of equipment and structures and four digits industry classification codes
(CIIU). The AMS underwent changes in methodology of sampling and identification of
plants, the creation of longitudinal linkages was necessary to consolidate plant identi-
fiers through three different periods: 1982-1991, a transition period in 1991-1993 and
7Due to data availability and for better comparability, both with the literature and across the data-
sets utilized here, we restrict our attention to manufacturing establishments. In Mexico, a very small
share of firms has more than one establishment: 2.5% out of approximately 3.6 million firms (Busso et
al., 2012). Additionally, it has been found that productivity at an establishment is positively related
to the productivity of the firm to which it belongs (Bartelsman & Doms, 2000): well-run firms will be
able to transfer technology, production methods, product designs and training across their production
units. A large part of the literature uses the establishment as the unit of analysis. This approach is, at
least in part, driven by data availability (Syverson, 2011).
8This data-set is also used in the cross-country study of firm dynamics by Bartelsman et al. (2009).
Camacho & Conover (2010) analyze the dispersion of firm productivity applying the methodology de-
veloped by Hsieh & Klenow (2009).
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1991-1998. Plant-level TFP was generated through the estimation of a capital-labor-
materials-energy production function (for details see Eslava et al., 2004).
For Mexico, the data is from the Economic Census 2009 conducted by the national
statistics institute (INEGI). The census captures private establishments with a fixed lo-
cation in urban areas and includes information on sales, workers, value added, value of
fixed capital and labor remunerations, among other variables. It covered a total of 17.6
million workers in 3.6 million establishments in manufacturing, retail and wholesale and
services (the figures for manufacturing are 4.6 and 0.4 million, respectively). In Mexico,
total urban private employment reaches 33 million workers, the majority of those not
captured by the Census belong to the informal sector and firms with less than 5 work-
ers (Busso, Fazio & Levy, 2012). In spite of this limitation it is considered the most
comprehensive in Latin America (see Busso, Fazio & Levy, 2012; Hsieh & Klenow, 2012).
2.3.2 Distribution of Employment and Establishments
Cross-country data shows that average size of both firms and establishments increase
with income per capita and aggregate productivity9 (Tybout, 2000; Alfaro, Charlton &
Kanczuk, 2009; Garcia-Santana & Ramos, 2013).
Table 2.1: Size Distribution of Establishments
USA1 <5 5-19 20-99 100-499 ≥500
establishments % 40.47 28.53 22.10 7.75 1.14
employment % 1.90 7.05 23.34 37.36 30.35
Mexico2 ≤5 6-20 21-100 101-500 >500
establishments % 84.18 11.49 2.85 1.12 0.36
employment % 17.47 9.94 11.81 23.58 37.20
1Cole, Greenwood & Sanchez (2012), 2Census INEGI (2009).
9This is not without limitations. As is well known, the statistical under-representation of small firms
(typically in the informal sector) in developing economies leads to understating the actual differences. An
exception has been documented in European transition economies: plants with less than 20 employees
account for a relatively small share of employment. This reflects the presence of large (formerly or still)
state-owned firms inherited from the central planning period (Bartelsman et al., 2009).
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According to the Economic Census of Mexico of 2009, 27.4% of employment and
95.7% of establishments were accounted for by production units with less than or equal
to 20 workers (Table 2.1). For the US, units with less than 20 workers account for 9%
and 69% of employment and establishments respectively. These differences are main-
tained across different broad industry categories: manufacturing, retail and services
(see the appendix for the size distribution by broad sectors for both establishments and
employment).
These numbers are likely to understate the real differences due to the under-representation
of small firms (Busso, Madrigal & Pages, 2012), particularly those in the informal sec-
tor.10 Leal Ordon˜ez (2013), using micro-enterprize and census data, estimates that the
informal sector accounts for 44-50% of employment.
In the case of Colombia, data is available for manufacturing establishments with over
10 workers. In 1998, the share of employment in firms with more than 500 workers is
25.6% (Camacho & Conover, 2010), while in the US, the equivalent figure (considering
manufacturing firms with over 10 workers) is 31.7%. The informal sector in Colombia
accounts for 52% of non-agricultural employment (ILO Statistics).
2.3.3 Establishment Life-Cycle Dynamics
This subsection documents the life-cycle growth of manufacturing firms in the US,
Colombia and Mexico.11 In the US most firms are born small: approximately 96.2
10In the Appendix I provide a description of the main activities in the informal sector. It is worth
noting that approximately 10% of the self-employed and micro-firm entrepreneurs were in that status
due to loss of their previous job or because they could not find alternative employment (National
Micro-Enterprise Survey of Mexico ENAMIN-2010), thus for the vast majority of the self-employed and
micro-firm entrepreneurs this is a (self-reported) voluntary status.
11Although international comparisons of firm data require caution and sometimes remain difficult to
interpret, there is evidence of significant cross-country differences in firm-dynamics and post-entry per-
formance. Differences in firm size are largely driven by within-sector differences and not by the sectoral
composition of the economy (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger & Scarpetta, 2009). For example, four-digits
industry effects account for less than ten percent of cross-section heterogeneity in output, employment
and productivity growth rates across establishments (Foster et al., 2001).
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percent of firms that are 0-1 years have less than 20 workers.12 Younger/smaller firms
have higher exit rates, but those that survive tend to grow faster than older/larger firms
(Klette & Kortum, 2004).
Table 2.2: The Life-Cycle of Establishments: Employment
USA1 Colombia3 Mexico1
relative size surv. all surv. all all
age 5-9/age 1-4 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.4
age 10-14/age 1-4 2.0 3.0 1.7 1.7 1.5
age 15-19/age 1-4 2.3 4.1 1.8∗ 2.1∗ 1.6
USA2 Colombia3 Mexico
growth in % surv. surv. all –
age 6/age 1 106.1 62.7 50.2 –
age 8/age 1 135.2 84.4 73.5 –
age 10/age 1 154.8 104.8 101.1 –
Source: 1Hsieh & Klenow (2012), 2Audretsch (1995),
3computed w/AMS-DANE (1982-1998), ∗age 15-16 only.
Audretsch (1995) computes the average employment growth rates for 11,154 man-
ufacturing firms established in 1976 for up to 10 years, we reproduce the results for
the growth rates of surviving firms (data is from the Small Business Data Base of the
US Small Business Administration). Hsieh & Klenow (2012) impute the life cycle from
the employment growth from 1992-1997, comparing the average size of establishments
within a given cohort grouped into five-year age bins (reproduced in Table 2.2).
The life-cycle growth of establishments for Colombia is computed using the AMS
panel database for the period 1982-1998. We are able to follow establishments up to age
16 (we cannot impute the age of establishments born in 1982 or earlier). For the growth
rate of all establishments in the lower panel first I compute, in every year, the average
12This is the average for the period 2000-2005. This group of firms (age 0-1 with less than 20 workers)
accounted for an average 13.2 percent of total job creation in the same period compared to 8.4 percent
for larger firms of age 0-1 (source: Business Dynamics Statistics, Census Bureau). New large firms are
partly associated with new U.S. affiliates of foreign-owned firms.
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size of all establishments of a particular age. Then I calculate the growth rate of this
average for each cohort. Finally, for each age I take the median across cohorts. For
example, to calculate growth at age 4, I have 13 observations representing cohorts of es-
tablishments born between 1983 and 1995. There is variation across cohorts, taking the
average across cohorts instead of the median results in slightly lower life-cycle growth.
To compute the growth of survivors in the lower panel, I compute the growth of each
individual establishment at each age, I take the average of establishment growth within
a cohort and then the median across cohorts (Table 2.2). This procedure is equivalent
to the one in Audretsch (1995) but repeated for different cohorts.
Table 2.3: The Life-Cycle of Establishments: Productivity
USA1 Colombia2 Mexico
relative avg. all surv. all all3 all1
age 5-9/age 1-4 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.5
age 10-14/age 1-4 2.1 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.6
age 15-19/age 1-4 2.8 1.3∗ 1.2∗ 1.5 1.6
Source: 1Hsieh & Klenow (2012),
2computed w/AMS-DANE (1982-1998), ∗age 15-16 only,
3computed w/INEGI Census (2009), cross section.
For the upper panel of Table 2.2, first I take the average of all establishments age
1-4 for each given year. To calculate the relative size at age 5-9, I can start in 1991 (the
first year where we have establishments of age 9) resulting in 8 observations, for age
10-14 we can start in 1996, resulting in 3 observations. This procedure is comparable to
that in Hsieh & Klenow (2012) but repeated for different cohorts. For Colombia, Table
2.3 uses firm TFP computed by Eslava et al. (2004).
For Mexico, we have data available from the 2009 Economic Census (a cross sec-
tion). Hsieh & Klenow (2012) are able to use the Census data for 1999, 2004, 2009,
which allows them to track cohorts for up to 10 years. It is not possible to compute
statistics for survivors since there is no information to link establishments across time.
We replicate their results for the life-cycle growth in terms of employment. For firm
43
level TFP, in the case of Mexico, we compare their results with estimates from the cross
section (Table 2.3).
2.4 Stylized Model of Innovation and Financial Constraints
In this section a stylized two-period model is presented to highlight the interaction be-
tween financial constraints and innovation along the intensive and extensive margins.13
The intensive margin considers how financial constraints affect innovation for a firm
with a given productivity level. The extensive margin refers to the possibility that gen-
eral equilibrium effects may lead to changes in the composition of firms.
In the first period no production takes place, the entrepreneur is endowed with fi-
nancial assets b > 0 which can be allocated to consumption c in the first period, to
savings b′ for the second period (in this section we assume there is no interest rate on
savings), or invested in the innovation good x. In this set-up, innovation investment
is fully financed with internal funds (evidence supporting this assumption is discussed
below).
In the second period knowledge capital can take low and high levels, n ∈ {n, n}
respectively, determining the production possibilities. There is a stochastic innovation
technology that determines the probability P (n |x) ∈ [0, 1] depending on the amount
invested in the innovation good x. This function is increasing and concave in x (de-
creasing marginal returns).
Production takes place in the second period. At this point the entrepreneur needs to
rent capital k at a cost equal to the interest rate r plus the physical depreciation rate of
capital δ. The rental of capital is subject to an exogenous collateral constraint k ≤ ψ b′,
where ψ ≥ 1 is a parameter that determines the ability to collateralize financial assets.
After production takes place, consumption for the entrepreneur results from profits of
13Alternative prototypical models of this interaction, with a complementary focus on liquidity shocks
and the cost of external finance, are discussed in Gorodnichenko & Schnitzer (2013).
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the firm and savings. Consumption is valued in both periods through a standard utility
function u(c) and discounted in the second period by β. The production technology is
given by n1−νkν with ν ∈ (0, 1).
In the second period, the profits of the firm given knowledge capital n and assets b′
are:
pi(n, b′) = max
{k}
n1−νkν − (r + δ) k s.t. k ≤ ψ b′
The intertemporal problem of the entrepreneur is to select consumption, savings and
investment in innovation to maximize expected discounted utility:
max
{x,c,b′≥0}
u(c) + β
∑
{n′}
P (n′ |x)u (pi(n′, b′) + b′) s.t. c+ x+ b′ = b
The intertemporal optimality equation for assets b′ is given by:
uc(c) = β
∑
{n′}
P (n′ |x)uc′
(
pi(n′, b′) + b′
)
(pib′(n
′, b′) + 1)
Where uc refers to marginal utility and pib′ is the derivative of profits in the sec-
ond period with respect to assets. This derivative will be positive when the collateral
constraint is binding. In addition to the standard consumption smoothing motive for
savings, there is an incentive to save to relax the collateral constraint in the second
period.
Consider the function P (n |x) = ζ xλ with parameters λ ∈ (0, 1) and ζ > 0, the in-
tertemporal optimality equation for innovation investment x is (in an interior solution):
uc(c) = β ζ λx
λ−1 (u(pi(n, b′) + b′)− u(pi(n, b′) + b′))
We are interested in understanding how financial constraints affect investment in
innovation. The left hand side on the intertemporal optimality condition of innovation
investment does not depend directly on ψ. The derivative of the right hand side, defining
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∆u = u(pi(n, b′) + b′)− u(pi(n, b′) + b′) is:
∂∆u
∂ψ
= uc′
(
pi(n, b′) + b′
) ∂pi(n, b′)
∂ψ
− uc′
(
pi(n, b′) + b′
) ∂pi(n, b′)
∂ψ
where it is always the case that:
∂pi(n, b′)
∂ψ
≥ ∂pi(n, b
′)
∂ψ
with strict inequality when the collateral constraint is binding (it can be binding either
in both states or in the high knowledge capital state). If the constraint is only binding
in the high knowledge capital state, then ∂∆u/∂ψ > 0: this implies that relaxing the
collateral constraint promotes innovation investment.
With logarithmic utility it can be proven that ∂∆u/∂ψ > 0, which again implies
that relaxing the collateral constraint promotes innovation investment. The same result
holds with u(c) = c, risk neutral preferences.14 With preferences u(c) = c1−σ/(1 − σ),
under some parameterizations (in particular relatively high σ), it is possible for inno-
vation investment to be decreasing in ψ. Innovation investment also depends positively
on initial assets. Note that in a dynamic model financial wealth is an endogenous state
variable and the entrepreneur may outgrow the collateral constraints by saving.
Suppose now that there are individuals with heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability,
which affects the production technology of the firm they manage. The production
function is (ϕn)1−νkν where ϕ, the entrepreneurial ability, varies across individuals. To
isolate the role of the extensive margin consider a risk neutral utility function and no
collateral constraint. The static profit maximization problem is given by:
pi(ϕn) = max
{k}
(ϕn)1−ν kν − (r + δ) k
14Caggese (2012) finds that uncertainty (as measured by the volatility in the sectoral profits-assets
ratio in a panel of manufacturing firms) reduces the innovation investment of entrepreneurial firms
(financially more undiversified) but not the innovation of non-entrepreneurial firms. These results cor-
respond to innovation related to the production of new products, which is linked to increased uncertainty
for the firm. The negative impact of uncertainty on innovation is larger for less diversified firms.
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The inter-temporal problem, simplified to isolate the role of the extensive margin,
is now given by:
max
{x}
−x+ β
∑
{n′}
P (n′ |x)pi(ϕn′)
With a small amount of algebra it can be shown that the optimal first order condition
for innovation investment in an interior solution is:
x1−λ = β ζ λϕ (n− n) (1− ν) (ν/(r + δ))ν/1−ν
This condition implies that x is increasing in ϕ when ν < 1. In the quantitative
model financial constraints lower the demand for labor resulting in lower wages. This
leads to individuals with lower entrepreneurial ability ϕ to set-up a firm.
2.5 Quantitative Model
The model builds upon the frameworks of occupational choice and heterogeneous en-
trepreneurial ability15 of Lucas (1978) and industry dynamics of Hopenhayn (1992).
There is a continuum of individuals who possess heterogeneous innate entrepreneurial
ability and every period decide whether to be workers or establish a firm and become
entrepreneurs. The operations of the firm are subject to transitory stochastic shocks
which are observed at the beginning of each period, before production and occupation
decisions are made. All individuals earn the same wage as workers, since there is no
heterogeneity in their effective units of labor and workers are perfectly mobile.16
The firm is a storehouse of information (Prescott & Visscher, 1980; Atkeson &
Kehoe, 2005), or knowledge capital (Klette & Kortum, 2004; Corrado et al. 2009).
15Differences in management quality are an important determinant of productivity differences across
firms (Bartelsman & Doms, 2000; Foster et al., 2001; Syverson, 2011).
16The evidence on whether labor markets are segmented across informal and formal sector firms
suggests mixed results at best, see the discussion in Perry et al. (2007, Ch. 3 and 4).
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Entrepreneurs in the formal sector can, while the firm is in operation, allocate re-
sources to investment in technology through a controlled stochastic process. Innova-
tion is an uncertain enterprize, as in Klette & Kortum (2004) and Atkeson & Burstein
(2010): entrepreneurs decide every period the amount of resources devoted to improving
firm productivity, which determines the probability of an increase in firm productivity.
Knowledge capital summarizes the history of past investment and innovation success of
the firm.17
The entrepreneur, who is both owner and manager of the firm, can opt to conduct
operations in the formal or informal sector. The trade-off is the following: formal sec-
tor firms have to pay an initial registration cost and taxes but they have better access
to external finance. Informal sector firms do not pay taxes or the initial registration
cost, but have no access to external finance and cannot accumulate knowledge capital.
Additionally informal sector firms face a specific convex cost of production. This cost
represents the inability to engage in legal contracts, the cost of enforcing property rights
when not protected by the government and worse access to infrastructure facilities and
services, etc. (Perry et al., 2007). Entrepreneurs may first establish their firm in the
informal sector and later transition to the formal sector but a formal sector entrepreneur
may not switch directly into the informal sector.
We can start introducing notation by letting s = (ϕ, n, a, b), where ϕ is the indi-
vidual’s permanent entrepreneurial ability, a is a transitory productivity shock, b are
financial assets and n is knowledge capital. Additionally z ∈ {i, f, w} denotes whether
the individual is an entrepreneur in the informal or formal sectors or a worker, respec-
tively.
17Klette & Kortum (2004) extend the endogenous growth literature by introducing research in incum-
bent firms. Aghion, Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes (2005) is a relatively recent example of the endogenous
growth literature, where the impact of financial frictions on economic growth is assessed.
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2.5.1 Preferences
Time is discrete and a period, indexed by t, represents a year. Individuals value the con-
sumption of the final good, denoted ct, through lifetime and intratemporal preferences
represented as follows:
U = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
(β (1− µ))t u(ct)
]
and u(ct) =
c1−σt
1− σ (1)
where β is the discount factor, σ is the coefficient that governs risk aversion. The
probability that an individual dies in every period is µ, so that the effective discount
factor is β (1−µ). When an individual dies, his assets disappear and he is immediately
replaced by another individual with the same entrepreneurial ability ϕ so that the mass
of individuals and their distribution over ability is constant (the rest of the initial state
variables are specified below).
2.5.2 Production Technology
In this economy production of the final good is carried out by single establishment
firms and each firm is managed by its owner/founder. Individuals posses innate and
permanent entrepreneurial ability ϕ received according to a distribution h(ϕ). Their
operations are subject to productivity shocks a that follow an AR(1) process discretized
in a Markov matrix denoted Λ(a′ | a). Additionally, entrepreneurs are able to accumulate
knowledge capital denominated n (through a process described below) and have access
to a decreasing returns to scale production technology (in terms of capital and labor)
that is common across sectors:
q = ea (ϕn)1−ν f(k, l)ν with f(k, l) = kα l1−α (2)
where k is capital and l is labor used in production. Following Lucas (1978), we call
ν < 1 the span-of-control parameter that determines the decreasing returns to scale
(with respect to capital and labor) in the production technology.
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2.5.3 Innovation Technology
Entrepreneurs can invest in the innovation good x to increase the stock of knowledge
capital.18 This good has price px.
19 Three outcomes are possible every period, de-
pending on the amount of investment in the innovation good in the previous period:
knowledge capital may increase by a proportion ∆, it may remain constant, or decrease
by ∆. Knowledge capital is defined on the grid {n, n (1 + ∆), n (1 + ∆)2, ... , n}, where
n and n are the lowest and highest possible levels of knowledge capital, respectively.20
The probability of a successful outcome is given by:
P (n′ = n (1 + ∆) |n, x) = ζ (x/n)λ (1− ε) (3a)
subject to the following conditions:
ζ (x/n)λ ∈ [0, 1] and {λ, ε} ∈ [0, 1) (3b)
There are diminishing returns to innovation investment x. Fixing a probability of
success in innovation, P (n (1 + ∆) | s, x), the necessary investment in innovation goods
x to increase the size of the firm by a fixed percentage is proportional21 to knowledge
capital n. The probability of the worst outcome:
P (n′ = n/(1 + ∆) |n, x) = ε (3c)
This shock represents negative events not influenced by firm decisions (obsolescence
of products, loss of markets to the competition, etc.). Alternatively, labor turnover may
lead to organizational forgetting (Benkard, 2000). Knowledge capital summarizes the
18The stochastic innovation process specified in this section builds on those considered by Klette &
Kortum (2004), Atkeson & Burstein (2010).
19We will initially consider the case where the innovation good is produced with the final good and
set px = 1. This can be extended to consider that innovation requires labor.
20The model can be extended to consider unbounded knowledge capital, which would require ad-
ditional conditions to guarantee a well defined dynamic program and convergence in the stationary
distribution (see Atkeson & Burstein, 2010).
21It can easily be verified that optimal labor and capital inputs, output and profit are proportional
to knowledge capital n under the production function previously specified in the case of no financial
restrictions and the unconditional mean value of the stochastic shock, ea = 1.
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history of investment and success in innovations and governs the size of the firm (as
in Klette & Kortum, 2004). Furthermore, it is lost when the firm closes (regardless of
whether exit is due to an exogenous exit shock or the entrepreneur finds it optimal to
close the firm). Knowledge capital is assumed to be completely firm-specific and there
is no market for its trade.
2.5.4 Workers
The problem of the worker amounts to a savings decision (borrowing is not allowed)
and determining the conditions under which he will prefer to establish a firm:
vw(s) = max{b′≥0}
u(c) + β (1− µ)
∑
{a′}
Λ(a′ | a) v(s′) (4)
s.t. c+ b′ = w + (1 + r) b and n = n
At the beginning of each period, after observing the transitory productivity shock
a, workers face their occupational choice:
v(s) = max{vi(s), vf (ϕ, n, a, b− ce), vw(s)} (5)
The worker is free to continue in the labor market and earn wage w every period,
become an informal sector entrepreneur (represented by the value vi), or a formal sector
entrepreneur, which requires paying the fixed registration cost ce (this value is repre-
sented by vf ).
Whenever individuals re-enter the labor market, their knowledge capital is reset to
n, this underscores the interpretation that it represents an intangible asset embedded in
the firm. Workers are not able to invest in innovation. We abstract from labor-income
risk.22 All new-born individuals receive an entrepreneurial ability ϕ from the distribu-
tion h(ϕ), transitory shock a from its unconditional distribution and initial assets b (set
22Labor income risk is an important factor in models of interest rate determination, we will abstract
from a complete model of the interest rate and set it exogenously (a standard small-open economy
assumption).
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equal to zero in the baseline model).
Occupational choice depends on the ability of the individual as an entrepreneur but
also on financial wealth, necessary to register the firm or to reach a profitable scale
when financial constraints are present. Figure 2.2 depicts the optimal occupation choice
(5) of a worker for a fixed level of productivity shock a, in an economy with a large
informal sector such as Mexico or Colombia. The graph has entrepreneurial ability ϕ
on the x-axis and b/w (financial assets normalized by the wage) on the y-axis.
2.5.5 Formal Sector Entrepreneurs
Given the choice of labor and capital input, profits for a formal sector entrepreneur are
given by:
pi(s, f) = q − (δ + r) k − w l
To register in the formal sector, entrepreneurs have to pay a fixed cost ce. Once
in the formal sector, the entrepreneur may go back to being a worker and ce is lost.
Additionally, the entrepreneur cannot transition directly to the informal sector, at least
one period has to be dedicated in the labor market:
vf (s) = max{l,k,x,b′≥0}
u(c) + β (1− µ)
∑
{a′, n′}
Λ(a′ | a)P (n′ |n, x) max{vw(s′), vf (s′)}
s.t. c+ b′ = (1− τ) (pi(s, f)− px x) + (1 + r) b and k ≤ k(s, f) (6)
where τ are taxes to profits. The entrepreneur is able to invest in the knowledge capital
of the firm as long as the formal firm is active, but is lost if the individual decides
to return to the labor market. The choice of capital input is restricted by an endoge-
nous collateral constraint, to which we turn shortly. The firm dies with the entrepreneur.
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2.5.6 Financial Markets
In specifying the endogenous collateral constraints I follow Amaral & Quintin (2010)
and Buera et al. (2011). At the beginning of a period the entrepreneur makes a deposit
b and rents capital k from a financial intermediary. At the end of the period, the en-
trepreneur receives his deposit earning interest rate r and pays the cost of capital rental
at the total rate of r+δ. Borrowing and capital rental are realized within a given period
and the assets of the individual are restricted to be positive b ≥ 0 in all periods.
Entrepreneurs may renege on financial contracts after production has taken place. If
this occurs, the entrepreneur keeps a fraction (1−ψ) of the un-depreciated capital and
the revenue net of labor and tax payments.23 The punishment for default is the loss of
the financial assets deposited with the financial intermediary b. Entrepreneurs regain
access to financial markets in the following period without additional costs. This implies
that a static condition determines enforceable allocations, allowing for the considera-
tion of financial constraints in a tractable manner. In this setup parameter ψ indexes
enforcement of financial contracts in the economy, which encompasses economies with
no credit ψ = 0 and perfect credit markets ψ = 1.
The analysis is restricted to financial contracts that are incentive-compatible, there
is no default in equilibrium. Effectively, imperfect enforcement of financial contracts
determines an upper bound k(s, f) on the amount of capital that entrepreneurs are able
to borrow.
In the case of no-default the entrepreneur receives profits net of taxes, plus interest
rate income from financial assets:
max
{ l }
(1− τ) (q − w l − (r + δ) k − px x) + (1 + r) b (7)
23I assume that the entrepreneur cannot avoid paying taxes in the event of default.
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In the case of default the entrepreneur would receive (off-equilibrium):
max
{ l }
(1− ψ) ((1− τ) (q − w l) + (1− δ) k)− (1− τ) px x (8)
Capital rental is said to be enforceable if and only if it satisfies (7) ≥ (8). Note
that equation (8) is specified so that investment in innovation px x does not distort the
bound of enforceable capital.24
The borrowing limit is increasing in financial wealth since the loss of collateral is
greater in the case of default. It is also increasing in productivity and entrepreneurial
ability, as only a share of output is kept in the case of default (see Amaral & Quintin,
2010; Buera et al., 2011).
2.5.7 Informal Sector Entrepreneurs
Informal sector entrepreneurs do not pay taxes but have no access to external finance. In
addition, there is a sector specific marginal cost that is increasing in output, determined
by parameter ξ. Profits for the informal sector firm are:
pi(s, i) = q (1− ξ q)− (r + δ) k − w l
The problem of the informal sector entrepreneur is:
vi(s) = max{l,k,b′≥0}
u(c) + β (1− µ)
∑
{a′}
Λ(a′ | a) v(s′) (9)
s.t. c+ b′ = pi(s, i) + (1 + r) b and k ≤ b
24The following timing assumptions within a period imply that investment in innovation does not
affect k(s, z): (1) entrepreneur observes shocks and rents capital, (2) production takes place, (3) capital
is returned to the intermediary and financial assets are returned to the entrepreneur, (4) investment in
the innovation good is decided. Innovation is financed with internal funds as it is subject to asymmetric
information problems and cannot be easily collateralized (see Hall & Lerner, 2010; Gorodnichenko &
Schnitzer, 2013).
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and face the same occupational decision as workers (with n = n):
v(s) = max{vi(s), vf (ϕ, n, a, b− ce), vw(s)}
The convex marginal cost specific to the production technology of informal sector
firms makes it increasingly costly for larger firms to remain informal and is therefore
a key determinant of the size of this sector and the size of firms in the sector. The
literature has documented the worse access of informal sector firms to different types
of public services and enforcement of property rights and the fact that informal sector
firms are relatively small and unproductive.
2.5.8 Equilibrium
The state space is given by (ϕ, n, a, b, z), we previously defined s = (ϕ, n, a, b) and
z ∈ {i, f, w}. Given taxes and registration costs (τ, ce) and interest rate r, a small-open
economy stationary competitive equilibrium consists of:
• optimal quantities {q(s, z)}z∈{i,f}, production inputs {l(s, z), k(s, z)}z∈{i,f},
• savings policy functions {b′(s, z)}z∈{i,f,w},
• policy function of investment in the innovation good {x(s, f)},
• wage w, values {v(s), vf (s), vi(s), vw(s)}, profits {pi(s, z)}z∈{i,f},
• invariant measure M(s, z) of individuals over the state space,
such that:
• workers solve (4), formal sector entrepreneurs solve (6), informal sectors entrepreneurs
solve (9),
• market clearing condition in the labor market holds (entrepreneurs/managers plus
workers equals the total mass of individuals), government revenues are dissipated,
• measure M(s, z) is consistent with individuals’ policy functions and optimal deci-
sion rules.
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2.6 Baseline Parameters
The model parameters are divided into three groups: (1) a group of standard parameters
taken from the literature, (2) a second group of parameters that are set to match key
features of the US economy, (3) a group of country-specific and institutional parameters.
Parameters in groups (1) and (2) are common for all countries in the model.
2.6.1 Common Parameters Across Countries
The interest rate r is set to 0.04 (Amaral & Quintin, 2010). The span-of-control param-
eter ν equal to 0.85 is taken from Atkeson & Kehoe (2005). The effective discount factor
β (1−µ) of 0.92 is from Buera et al. (2011). We consider the case σ → 1, log-preferences
as in Midrigan & Xu (2013). Parameters α of 1/3 and δ equal to 0.08 are standard in
the literature.
Table 2.4: Predetermined Parameters
parameter value description
β (1− µ) 0.92 effective discount factor
σ → 1 risk aversion
r 0.04 interest rate (open economy)
ν 0.85 span-of-control
α 1/3 income share of capital
δ 0.08 capital depreciation rate
ρ 0.50 autocorrelation coefficient
σε 0.40 standard deviation of shocks
For the parameters ρ and σε that govern the idiosyncratic productivity process I
take the mid-range of the values estimated by Abraham & White (2006) for a plant-
level data-set that covers the manufacturing sector in the US for the period 1976-1999.
The standard deviation is approximately equal to the median of the firm-level cross
country estimates by Asker et al. (2012).
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We now turn to the calibrated parameters in Table 2.5. The exogenous exit rate µ
is set to match a total firm exit rate of 0.10. In the model the total exit rate equals the
sum of the rate of entrepreneurs deciding to close their firms and the exogenous exit
rate. Entrepreneurial ability is distributed according to a discrete Pareto distribution
(truncated, with 15 possible values), its parameter is set to match the average size of
firms in the US in the period 1995-2005 (Helfand et al., 2007).
Table 2.5: Calibrated Parameters - US Moments
parameter par. value
exogenous exit rate µ 0.08
Pareto dist. (truncated, discrete, scaled) h(ϕ) 0.72
innovation technology - level ζ 25
innovation technology - curvature λ 0.69
prob. down negative shock ε 0.15
size innovation steps ∆ 0.36
target target model
firm exit rate 0.10 0.10
average firm size 22.2 22.0
average size age 20− 24/avg. size age < 5 5.3 5.2
average size age 15− 19/avg. size age < 5 4.1 3.9
average size age 10− 14/avg. size age < 5 3.0 2.5
average size age 5− 10/avg. size age < 5 2.0 1.4
The technology accumulation parameters target the life-cycle growth of firms in
terms of labor as in Hsieh & Klenow (2012). For example, I target the average size of
firms that are 15-19 years relative to firms that are younger than 5 years old for US
manufacturing firms. With these parameters, the model underestimates the growth of
firms, in particular at the earlier stages. Additionally, Midrigan & Xu (2013) find that
for Korea (a developed economy), the ratio of total investment in intangibles over value
added is 0.046 for a data-set of manufacturing firms. This value, however, is 0.01 in my
model.
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2.6.2 Country Specific and Institutional Parameters
Next, we need to specify parameters that are country specific or determined by insti-
tutions. The registration cost is from Djankov et al. (2002): it represents the cost
of obtaining legal status to operate a firm, expressed as a share of per capita GDP in
1999. It includes all identifiable official expenses (fees, costs of procedures and forms,
fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges, etc.) as well as the monetized value of the
entrepreneurs time. The time of the entrepreneur is valued as the product of time re-
quired for registration and per capita GDP in 1999 expressed in per business day terms.
Ignoring the time value component, the cost is 0.57 in terms of GDP per capita for
Mexico and 0.15 for Colombia.
Table 2.6: Institutional/Country Specific Parameters
description par. US Mex. Col.
total tax rate (% profits)∗ τ 0.46 0.55 0.74
registration cost formal sector∗ ce 0.02 0.83 0.34
collateral constraint ψ 1.00 0.25 0.34
informal sector convex cost ξ 1.00 0.01 0.02
targets par. US Mex. Col.
private credit/output (formal sector) ψ 2.3 0.2 0.2
% share of informal sector labor ξ 0 46 49
∗Source: World Bank & Djankov et al. (2002).
Reg. cost in terms of GDP per capita.
Parameter ψ determines financial development. As is standard in the literature, to
set its value I target the ratio of private credit provided by financial institutions and pri-
vate bond markets over GDP (Beck et al., 2009). For Colombia and Mexico the target
corresponds to the middle of the period of the AMS-DANE data-set and for the formal
sector following Midrigan & Xu (2013). The value for the US results in an economy with
perfect financial markets (the average of the ratio for the 10 years between 1992-2001 is
2.3 which covers the period of the data used to impute firm life-cycle growth in Hsieh
& Klenow, 2012).25
25Note that the amplification of misallocation refers to a comparison within a country keeping the
level of financial development fixed and not a cross-country comparison. These exercises are discussed
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The parameter that determines the convex marginal cost specific to the informal
sector ξ affects the optimum production scale of informal sector firms. The target is
the share of employment in the informal sector, equal to 0.45 for Mexico and 0.50 for
Colombia. A lower value of ξ is necessary for Mexico relative to Colombia, since taxes
are much higher in the latter case.
The tax rate τ , taken from the World Bank Doing Business Survey, is a measure of
the total amount of taxes and mandatory contributions expressed as a share of com-
mercial profits for a standardized business (after accounting for allowable deductions
and exemptions). This measure considers taxes at all levels of government and includes
the profit or corporate income tax, social security contributions, labor taxes paid by
the employer and dividend taxes, among others. Taxes withheld (such as the personal
income tax) or collected and remitted to tax authorities (such as value added taxes,
sales taxes) are excluded. This measure simplifies a more complex tax structure that
would distort capital labor ratios in the model.
2.7 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, the main quantitative results of the paper are presented and discussed.
2.7.1 Main Results
The main result of this paper is that misallocation losses in a model of financial con-
straints are amplified when we introduce endogenous firm-productivity accumulation.
For exposition, we can equivalently define the potential gains from eliminating the dis-
persion across firms in the marginal productivity of capital. The focus is on the formal
sector to avoid concerns related to measurement in the informal sector. Let J be the
set of firms producing in the formal sector. It can be shown that TFP∗ in the case of
below.
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no financial constraints is:26
TFP ∗ =
 ∑
{j∈J}
(eaj )
1
1−ν (ϕj nj)
1−ν (10)
With financial constraints the marginal productivity of capital, and therefore the
output-capital ratios, vary across firms and aggregate TFP is:
TFP =
[∑
{j∈J}(e
a
j )
1
1−ν (ϕj nj) (qj/kj)
−αν
1−ν
]1−(1−α) ν
[∑
{j∈J}(e
a
j )
1
1−ν (ϕj nj) (qj/kj)
(1−α) ν−1
1−ν
]αν (11)
An efficient allocation implies equalizing the marginal product of capital and there-
fore the average product as well. The gains from eliminating misallocation in the model
are computed as TFP ∗/TFP − 1, with the following interpretation: keeping the set of
firms and their productivity constant, this number represents the gains of eliminating
differences in the marginal product of capital across firms. This exercise is analogous to
the empirical studies in Hsieh & Klenow (2009) and Busso, Madrigal & Pages (2012).27
Note that this is different from the comparison of aggregate TFP across countries, which
I label the potential (total) TFP gain in Table 2.7. The latter comparison takes into
account the fact that financial frictions also affect the distribution of firm productivity.
For example, aggregate TFP is 19% lower in Mexico (formal sector) compared to the US.
The results show that the potential misallocation gains are 14.7% and 15.8% for
Mexico and Colombia in the model with endogenous firm productivity accumulation
(Table 2.7). I also solve the model without knowledge capital accumulation, equivalent
to setting ∆ = 0. It is not necessary to change the parameters of financial development
ψ and taxes on profits τ . However, ξ needs to be modified keeping the same target of
the size of the informal sector for each country, while ce is changed to target its value
relative to output per capita (neither one of these parameters enters TFP or TFP ∗
directly). Potential misallocation gains in this model are 7.3% and 3.8% for Mexico and
26See Midrigan & Xu (2013) and Buera et al. (2011).
27In the model presented here, as in many models of financial frictions, the only source of dispersion
in output-capital ratios is financial underdevelopment.
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Colombia, respectively. The larger amplification for Colombia reflects the higher level
of taxes in that country.
Table 2.7: General Results
variable∗ US Mex. Col.
potential misallocation gain – 14.7% 15.8%
potential (total) TFP gain – 19.0% 23.4%
output per capita total 1.00 0.44 0.39
output per capita formal 1.00 0.47 0.42
output per capita informal – 0.39 0.36
wage 1.00 0.47 0.43
capital/output total 2.34 0.58 0.56
total exit rate 0.10 0.13 0.13
total average firm size 22.0 6.3 5.8
∗TFP and misallocation refer to the formal sector.
To decompose misallocation gains first define the following variables:
X = (ea)1/1−ν (ϕn) Y =
( q
k
)−αν
1−ν
Z =
( q
k
) (1−α) ν−1
1−ν
Without financial constraints, the unconstrained equivalents of Y and Z (derived
from the first order conditions of the static profit maximization problem of the firm)
are:
Y ∗ =
(
r + δ
α ν
)−αν
1−ν
Z∗ =
(
r + δ
α ν
) (1−α) ν−1
1−ν
We can rewrite TFP in the model with financial constraints in terms of covariances
and averages:
TFP = J1−ν
[σ(X,Y ) + E(X)E(Y )]1−(1−α) ν
[σ(X,Z) + E(X)E(Z)]αν
(12)
We can now decompose potential misallocation gains into two steps:
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(1) Set Y and Z equal to its optimal unconstrained levels Y ∗ and Z∗. For Colombia,
for example, this step generates a gain of 3.2% in the model without knowledge
capital and 9.6% in the model with knowledge capital.
(2) Eliminate the covariances by setting σ(X,Y ) = σ(X,Z) = 0. For Colombia, this
step generates a gain of only 0.6% in the model without knowledge capital and
6.1% in the model with knowledge capital, given that σ(X,Y ) and σ(X,Z) are
more negative in the latter model. For Mexico, this step generates a gain of 2.1%
in the model without knowledge capital and 6.9% in the model with knowledge
capital.
Table 2.8: Misallocation
misallocation % Mex. Col.
knowledge capital 14.7 15.8
no knowledge capital 7.3 3.8
The covariance terms reflect the fact that it is not only the variance in the marginal-
productivity of capital that determines misallocation, but it is also important which
firms are constrained. This is related to the discussion of the role of the correlation
between firm productivity and distortions in Restuccia & Rogerson (2008) and Hopen-
hayn (2012). In the model without knowledge capital, due to the fact that shocks are
mean-reverting, a firm that is highly constrained in one period is likely to be less con-
strained in the following period. In a model with knowledge capital, a firm that is very
constrained in one period can again be very constrained in the following period if the
endogenous productivity component increases (this is further discussed below).
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Figure 2.1: Employment over Firm Life-Cycle (Model)
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Fig. 1. Employment Growth over Life Cycle − Model
2.7.2 Firm Life-Cycle Productivity and Employment Growth
In Table 2.9 I compute the life-cycle growth and accumulation of knowledge capital for
the three baseline model economies. By age 15, the ratio of n{age=15}/n is on average
15.7 in the US, but it is less than half this number for Colombia and Mexico. These dif-
ferences in endogenous productivity accumulation translate into lower life-cycle growth
of firms, as shown in the lower panel.
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Figure 2.2: Occupation Choice (Mexico/Colombia)
Fig. 2. Occupation Choice (Mexico/Colombia)
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Table 2.9: Baseline Results: Firm Knowledge Capital and Size
USA Mexico Colombia
knowledge cap.1 all formal2 all formal2 all
age 5/age 1 2.8 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.1
age 10/age 1 7.9 3.9 3.5 3.6 2.7
age 15/age 1 15.7 7.0 6.9 7.9 7.4
USA Mexico Colombia
# workers3 all all all
age 6-10/age 1-5 1.4 1.2 1.2
age 11-15/age 1-5 2.5 2.1 1.3
1Average across firms of n{age=x}/n.
2Firms that are formal at age x. 3Includes manager.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the model cross-section of log(nϕ) including formal and
informal sector firms with respect to age: the x-axis corresponds to the age of the firm
and y-axis corresponds to log(nϕ). I fit a quadratic polynomial to this relationship,
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where the number of simulated firms was increased until the results were unchanged.
The range of log(nϕ) incorporates an extensive-margin effect: in Mexico managers with
lower entrepreneurial ability ϕ set up firms, specially in the informal sector (these firms
are not included in the TFP/misallocation computations). The fitted value of log(ϕn)
is lower at every age in Mexico. To isolate the life-cycle component of knowledge cap-
ital, Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the model cross-section of log(n) with respect to age for
Mexico and US only for formal sector firms.
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Figure 2.3: log(ability*knowledge) - Mexico
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Figure 2.4: log(ability*knowledge) - US
0 5 10 15 20 25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
age of firm (cross section)
lo
g(a
bil
ity
*k
no
wl
ed
ge
)
Fig. 4. log(ability*knowledge) − US
extensive
margin
66
Figure 2.5: log(knowledge) - Mexico (formal sector)
Figure 2.6: log(knowledge) - US (formal sector)
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2.7.3 Firm Dynamics in the Model and Data
Table 2.10: Regressions with Simulated Model and Data Firms
explained: output/cap. data knowledge standard
variables (logs) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
lag - output/cap.*firm TFP -0.02∗ – -0.04 – -0.43 –
lag - firm TFP – -0.06∗ – -1.38 – -3.38
lag - output/capital ratio 0.58∗ 0.58∗ 0.42 0.95 0.76 1.46
year-age controls, firm f. effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry controls yes yes no no no no
R2 - within 0.37 0.37 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.64
Statistical significance ∗1%. (model regressions: all coefficients significant).
As previously discussed, the joint dynamics of output-capital ratios and firm pro-
ductivity have implications for the impact of financial constraints on misallocation. In
the model without knowledge capital, productivity shocks are purely stochastic and
mean-reverting. In this case, a firm that is highly constrained in one period is likely
to be less constrained in the following period. In a model with knowledge capital, a
firm that is constrained in one period can again be highly constrained in the following
period if the endogenous productivity component increases. The table below shows that
the model with knowledge capital is better able to replicate the dynamics between firm
productivity and output-capital ratios estimated from the data.
In terms of firm productivity growth the model with knowledge capital also performs
better than the standard model (Table 2.11).28
28This also holds if we consider firm productivity levels instead of firm productivity growth.
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Table 2.11: Regressions with Simulated Model and Data Firms
explained: TFP growth data knowledge standard
variables1 (logs) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
firm TFP -0.45∗ -0.56∗ -1.20 -1.10 -1.87 -1.75
output/capital ratio 0.05∗ 0.06∗ 0.27 0.22 0.40 0.34
age of firm – -0.03∗ – -0.10 – -0.11
year controls, firm f. effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry controls yes yes no no no no
R2 - within 0.19 0.24 0.33 0.34 0.44 0.45
Statistical significance ∗1%. (model regressions: all coefficients significant).
1TFP growth computed between t and t+ 1, regressors in period t.
2.7.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Introducing knowledge capital can affect the stochastic properties of firm productivity
ea (ϕn)1−ν and affect the level of misallocation. The role of persistence in firm pro-
ductivity is discussed in Buera & Shin (2011). They argue that lower persistence may
increase losses from misallocation. I compute the model without knowledge capital with
a persistence parameter as low as 0.2 for Mexico: misallocation increases but only to
8.8% (increasing persistence reduces misallocation in my simulations). Although fur-
ther exercises and alternative calibrations may be conducted, the stochastic properties
of the process including knowledge capital do not seem independently responsible for
the increase in misallocation: in the baseline calibration of the model with knowledge
capital for Mexico, the variance of the marginal productivity of capital is 0.15, close to
the lower bound of 0.14 in Midrigan & Xu (2013) and slightly above the 0.12 for my
model without knowledge capital.
2.8 Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the link between
firm productivity dynamics and aggregate production efficiency. In particular I focus
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on TFP losses attributed to misallocation, which the empirical literature finds to be
quantitatively important.
The underdevelopment of financial markets has been proposed as a source of mis-
allocation. However, in a quantitative calibrated model, misallocation losses generated
by financial underdevelopment are modest, as pointed out by Midrigan & Xu (2013).
I find that considering a model with endogenous firm-productivity accumulation, the
misallocation losses are amplified. In the case of Mexico financial constraints generate
losses of 7.3% in a model without endogenous firm-productivity and 14.7% in a model
with firm-productivity accumulation. This result suggests that the life-cycle accumula-
tion in firm productivity can be important for understanding how financial constraints
can generate misallocation. Furthermore, financial constraints affect the distribution
of firm productivity and the level of aggregate TFP by distorting the accumulation of
productivity at the firm level.
Chapter 3
The Blighted Youth: An
International Comparison of
Life-Cycle Unemployment
3.1 Introduction
Across advanced OECD economies, youth unemployment rates are typically at least
double those of adult unemployment rates and are more sensitive to business cycle fluc-
tuations. Bell & Blanchflower (2011), for example, estimate that youth unemployment
rates change 1.79 percentage points for each 1 per cent change in adult rates. The large
negative and long-lasting effects on earnings for young workers of entering the labor
market in a downturn have been well documented (discussed below). In countries like
Spain and Greece, where the unemployment rate for workers of age 15-24 has recently
surpassed 50%, the welfare implications are potentially large.
The purpose of our study is to evaluate the costs of recessions and, in particular,
the long lasting effects on young workers entering the labor market during a downturn1.
To this effect we build an heterogeneous worker life-cycle model of unemployment with
1Standard models of search and unemployment, in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) tra-
dition, are not able to generate earnings losses comparable to those found in the data (Davis & von
Wachter, 2011).
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on-the-job human capital accumulation and aggregate productivity shocks2. We are
interested the quantitative role of the tax-wedge and minimum wages in determining
the impact of recessions on unemployment rates across countries.
The quantitative model builds upon the theoretical work of Guido Menzio & Shouy-
ong Shi (2010a, 2010b, 2011). They develop a framework of directed job search and
free entry of firms. The main advantage of this framework is the nature of the resulting
block recursive equilibrium: value and policy functions of agents are independent of the
endogenous distribution of workers across individual states (in our version they will de-
pend on the aggregate state of the economy only through the realization of the aggregate
productivity state). This framework is thus particularly useful due to its tractability
for analyzing the effect of aggregate productivity shocks on the labor market.
Most closely related to our paper is Menzio et al. (2012). They study a life-cycle
model with on-the-job human capital accumulation, search and learning frictions and
use this theory to decompose the life-cycle profile of wages, transition rates and produc-
tivity into the effects of age variation in work-life expectancy, human capital and match
quality.
Our interest is on the interaction of recessions and labor market institutions, the tax-
wedge and minimum wages in particular. Therefore we introduce aggregate productivity
shocks. To consider labor market institutions we modify the wage determination process
from Menzio et al. (2012). In our model the market where a worker decides to search
is indexed by ability, age, human capital and the wage paid in the first period. If the
match is maintained posterior wages are determined through a Nash-bargaining process.
We also extend the model by introducing heterogeneous ability of workers. Huggett,
Ventura & Yaron (2006) exploit a life-cycle model of human capital accumulation to
2We abstract from welfare losses associated with incomplete markets for risk sharing. Rogerson &
Schindler (2002) asses the welfare costs of the risk of job displacement, associated with large persistent
losses in income. They abstract from heterogeneity in idiosyncratic wage growth (other than that
generated by a displacement shock) and from labor market frictions that affect the outcomes experienced
by workers.
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replicate the age dynamics and cross-sectional properties of the US earnings distribu-
tion. They find that differences in the ability to accumulate human capital are essential
to reproduce an increase in earnings dispersion over the life cycle and that these dif-
ferences account for the bulk of the variation in the present value of earnings across
agents. Huggett et al. (2011) find that as of age 23, heterogeneity in initial conditions
in terms of human capital and learning ability (capacity to accumulate human capital)
is the main source of variation in realized lifetime earnings3, as opposed to shocks re-
ceived over their lifetime. There is evidence from the literature on recessions and youth
unemployment that low ability young workers suffer larger losses than higher ability
young workers. Furthermore, since these workers will not be able to accumulate human
capital, it may affect the persistence of unemployment rates. Workers with less edu-
cation typically have higher unemployment rates and these rates are more sensitive to
business cycle fluctuations.
In our quantitative framework we find that youth unemployment rates are higher
and more sensitive to increments in the tax-wedge relative to total unemployment rates.
We then simulate one time shocks to aggregate productivity and compare the evolution
of unemployment rates in economies with different tax-wedges. We provide estimates
of losses in terms of present discounted value of earnings to young workers in different
aggregate states of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the literature on
the impact of recessions on young workers entering the labor market, S.3.3 provides a
brief overview on the empirical evidence and theoretical work on different institutions
and policies and labor market outcomes, S.3.4 and S.3.5 describe our theoretical frame-
work and the nature of the block recursive equilibrium, S.3.6 consists of a discussion of
the parameters as well as the quantitative analysis of the model, S.3.7 concludes with
final comments.
3Their choice of age is given by the observation that many people will have finished formal schooling.
We note that the literature that estimates the impact of youth unemployment on lifetime/long-term
earnings considers the range 16/18 to 25 (discussed below). Huggett et al. (2011) calibrate the initial
conditions in terms of human capital as exogenous. Admittedly, as those authors recognize, pushing
back the age will raise the issue of the importance of one’s family or, more broadly, one’s environment.
We leave that as a topic for further research.
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3.2 The Long-Term Impact of Recessions on Youth
Entering the labor market during a recession has a large negative and persistent impact
on the labor earnings of the young4. Unemployment generates a direct loss of income
but there are additional large and long lasting effects that represent costs above the
direct cost. The literature is too vast for a complete review, but a set of the main
results is presented, with a focus on the evidence for advanced OECD economies5.
The general consensus is that an unemployment spell consistently imposes a persis-
tent wage scar upon individuals both in terms of income and posterior unemployment
spells (Arumpalam, 2001; Gregg & Tominey, 2005). It is also known that recessions
are associated with relatively large increases in unemployment for the young and those
with low education (Genda et al., 2010; Bell & Blanchflower, 2011).
Although not focusing on recessions, Kletzer & Fairlie (2003) estimate the long-term
costs of job displacement for young adults: five years after a job loss the shortfall in
annual earnings is 9% lower for men relative to what would have been expected absent
the job loss. For older workers total losses largely represent immediate earnings losses
whereas for young workers the loss of opportunities for rapid earnings growth is more
important (they find that young displaced workers do not experience a large decline in
earnings following displacement). For young workers, substantial costs may be associ-
ated with job displacement in the form of missed or delayed opportunities to accumulate
human capital.
Kahn (2010) analyzes the labor market experience of those graduating from college
4Youth is defined as age over the minimum school-leaving age (typically 16-18 for OECD countries)
and less than 25 (Bell & Blanchflower, 2011).
5We abstain from comparing these estimations across countries. The wide differences in labor market
institutions, educational systems, demographic environments, data availability and applied methodolo-
gies make any attempt to compare the estimates an uninteresting exercise (this is a point already made
in the literature). A discussion of the statistical techniques employed in the literature is outside the
scope of this paper.
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as a function of macroeconomic conditions in the US. She estimates an initial wage loss
of 6-7% for a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate measure and even
15 years after college graduation the loss is 2.5% and statistically significant.
Table 3.1: The Long-Term Impact of Recessions on Youth
country earn. loss period/lag exercise (shock)
Austria 6.5% accumulated 1 p.p. unemp. rate increase
Canada 5% accumulated 5 p.p. unemp. rate increase
Japan 5-7% 12 yrs. later 1 p.p. unemp. rate increase
USA 2.5% 15 yrs. later 1 p.p. unemp. rate increase
Sweden 17% 5 yrs. later 50 days youth unemployment
UK 10% at age 42 6 months+ of youth unemp.
Source: Brunner & Kuhn (Austria, 2010), Oreopoulos et al.
(Canada, 2012), Genda et al. (Japan, 2010), Nordstro¨m Skans
(Sweden, 2004), Gregg & Tominey (UK, 2005), Kahn (2010, USA).
For Canada, Oreopoulos et al. (2012), also considering those graduating from col-
lege, estimate that a rise in unemployment rates by 5 percentage points implies an initial
loss in earnings of about 9 percent that halves within 5 years and finally fades to zero
after 10 years. The role of heterogeneity is also emphasized: advantaged graduates (at
the top of the wage distribution) suffer less as they recover within 2-4 years through a
process of mobility towards better firms, while earnings of less advantaged graduates
can be permanently affected by cyclical downgrading. The least advantaged suffer a loss
of 8 percent of cumulative earnings in their first 10 years, double those of the median
graduate. The effects of a recession are strongest for young workers, relative to workers
with more experience.
For Austria, Brunner & Kuhn (2010) estimate the effects of labor market entry
conditions on wages of males entering the labor market and find that a one percentage
point increase in the initial local unemployment rate is associated with an approximate
shortfall in lifetime earnings of 6.5 percent (average of the accumulated wage losses
within the first 20 years of labor market experience). For Japan, Genda et al. (2010)
estimate that a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate at entry reduces the
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likelihood of being employed by 3-4 percentage points for over 12 years. The same event
leads to earnings losses of 5-7% for over 12 years for those without college education.
Moreover, a recession at the time of entry not only lowers annual earnings but also raises
the likelihood of nonemployment and part-time employment for the less educated. A
considerable part of the negative on earnings is the effect through lower likelihood of
regular stable employment.
For the UK, Gregg & Tominey (2005) estimate the scar from early unemployment
to be approximately 10% at age 42 for having over 6 months of youth unemployment
if individuals avoid repeat exposure to unemployment. The negative impact is approx-
imately twice as large if the effect on repeated unemployment is taken into account.
Early individual unemployment experiences significantly raise the propensity to adult
unemployment (see also Gregg, 2001). The role of heterogeneity is emphasized (see also
Burgess et al., 2003). The literature in general stresses the importance of heteorgeneity6
associated with education and ability of the young workers. Individuals securing bet-
ter qualifications on leaving full-time education are less prone to youth unemployment.
This suggests that education can help youths recover from early unemployment but it
is not commonly undertaken.
For Sweden, Nordstro¨m Skans (2004) estimate that 50 days of unemployment in the
year following high school graduation leads to a 3 percentage points higher probability
to experience a similar period of unemployment and a decrease in total annual earnings
of 17% 5 years later. In Norway, Raaum & Røed (2006) find that individuals who face
depressed local labor markets (6% local unemployment rate vs. 1%) when they grad-
uate from secondary education, are subject to relatively high rates of non-employment
during their whole prime-age work career.
The severity of long term income losses depend on the business cycle: Davis & von
Wachter (2011) estimate that in present value terms men lose on average 1.4 years of pre-
displacement earnings if displaced in mass-layoffs events that occur when the national
6This is not without econometric challenges: identifying causal effects of past unemployment is a
difficult task due to unobserved heterogeneity.
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unemployment rate is below 6 percent. This loss doubles to 2.8 years of pre-displacement
earnings if the event occurs when the unemployment rate exceeds 8 percent.
A number of theories can potentially predict persistent negative effects from un-
employment (see Gregg & Tominey, 2005). An unemployment spell can lead to the
depreciation of general skills7 and the loss of firm specific skills. For those entering the
labor market, time without a job is time forgone in terms of human capital accumula-
tion. Theories of on-the-job search will predict that displacement from a high quality
match implies a higher probability of return to a low quality position. Therefore, losses
may not solely be due to human capital depreciation. For young workers, mobility plays
an important role as it contributes to early wage growth8. Theories of screening have
also been considered as mechanisms that are able to generate persistent income losses
from unemployment. Michaud (2012) provides a theory of information and labor mar-
kets with search and matching to account for persistent wage losses of laid-off workers.
In this set-up employer uncertainty about unemployed workers’ abilities can account for
71% of the long-term wage losses following a lay-off.
We note also that some of these studies estimate the losses suffered by individuals
who had unemployment spells, while others refer to losses for those entering the labor
market in a downturn but did not experience unemployment. The main channel consid-
ered in our theory is through on-the-job human capital accumulation and depreciation.
In a recession, youth unemployment rates are higher. Young workers without a job
are unable to accumulate human capital, affecting their long term income prospects.
Additionally, workers that lose their jobs lose a part of their human capital.
7More generally, unemployment spells are also associated with declines in health and general well-
being (Bell & Blanchflower, 2011; Davis & von Wachter, 2011).
8There is a sizable literature analyzing the sources of life-cycle wage growth. To mention a recent
example, Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay & Robin (2013) construct and estimate an equilibrium job
search model with human capital accumulation, employer heterogeneity and individual level shocks.
Career wage growth is decomposed into the contributions of human capital and job search: typically
considered the two main driving forces of the earnings/experience profile.
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3.3 Policies and Labor Markets
This section provides brief overviews of recent empirical evidence and theoretical work,
with a focus on OECD economies.9
Table 3.2: Unemployment Rate Equations
total (male) youth (male)
tax wedge 0.28∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
union density -0.06∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.04
employment protection -0.55∗ -0.50 0.51 -0.38
high corporatism -1.14∗∗∗ -1.43∗∗∗ -1.17 -1.73∗∗
avg. replacement rate 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.08∗
output gap -0.50∗∗∗ − -0.98∗∗∗ −
tfp shock − -10.99∗∗∗ − -27.44∗∗∗
terms of trade − 18.51∗∗∗ − 33.86∗∗∗
interest rate − 0.16∗∗∗ − 0.26∗∗∗
labor demand − 17.60∗∗∗ − 33.87∗∗∗
country controls yes yes yes yes
time controls yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.89
n. observations 405 372 404 371
Stat. significance: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Source: Bassanini & Duval (2006), World Development Indicators.
The tax wedge is defined as the difference between the gross labor costs to employers
and the consumption wage paid to employers, i.e. the wage after deduction of direct and
indirect taxes, including payroll taxes, income taxes and consumption taxes (Addison
& Teixeira, 2001). Nickell et al. (2005) estimate that a 10 percentage point increase
in total employment tax rate leads to approximately a 1 percentage point increase in
unemployment in the long run. They also find that changes in labor market institutions
9Addison & Teixeira (2001) survey the literature on the labor market consequences of employment
protection legislation. They conclude that the preponderance of the studies support the hypothesis that
stricter employment protection rules result in lower employment-population ratios. There is, however,
no consensus with respect to the effect on unemployment rates. See also Bassanini & Duval (2006) and
Nickell et al. (2005). The ambiguous impact of firing costs is also found in the theoretical literature
(see Ljungqvist, 2002).
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explain approximately 55% of the rise in European unemployment from the 1960s to
the first half of the 1990s, much of the remainder being due to the deep recession in the
latter period. They estimate that changes in the benefit system and increases in labor
taxes contribute the most to the increase of 6.8 percentage points in unemployment in
this period: the combination of benefits and taxes are responsible for two thirds of the
part of the long-term rise in European unemployment that the considered institutions
explain (see also Nickell & Layard, 1999).
In line with these findings, Bassanini & Duval (2006) estimate that changes in labor
market institutions can account for two-thirds of non-cyclical unemployment changes
in OECD countries. In particular, they estimate that a 10 percentage point reduction
in the tax wedge would be associated with a drop in the unemployment rate by 2.8
percentage points. They also conclude that the level and duration of unemployment
benefits have a significantly positive impact on unemployment. We re-estimate their
specifications using male unemployment rates. For a 10 percent point reduction in the
tax wedge the total male unemployment rate increases by 2.1-2.8 percentage points,
the youth unemployment rate increases by 3.4-4.5 percentage points (Table 3.2). Youth
unemployment rates are more sensitive to different types of macroeconomic shocks.
There is work examining the interaction of labor market institutions with the busi-
ness cycle. Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012b). estimate a large negative impact of financial
crises on unemployment, finding that the effect is less pronounced in the short-run (gen-
erally less than or equal to 2-3 years) but more persistent in countries with more rigid
labor market institutions. The effects are larger for youth unemployment. It is often
found that unemployment for youth is more sensitive to labor market institutions. Nick-
ell & Layard (1999) argue that minimum wages are likely to have a significant impact
on the unemployment rate of low skill and young workers.
In terms of theoretical work, Prescott (2004) uses a neoclassical growth model with
a stand-in household to argue that variations in tax rates account for most differences
in labor supply in advanced G7 economies. Ohanian, Raffo & Rogerson (2008), also
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exploiting a neoclassical growth model, confirm that taxes can account for a large pro-
portion of cross-country differences and variation in hours worked (the product of to-
tal civilian employment and annual hours per worker) for a set of OECD countries.
Ljungqvist & Sargent (2007) examine the previous analysis and emphasize the role of
differences in unemployment benefits rather than tax rates to explain cross-country dif-
ferences in employment.10
3.4 Baseline Environment
In this section we describe the theoretical framework without permanent heterogeneous
ability to avoid cumbersome notation11. The framework consists of a life-cycle model
with on-the-job human capital accumulation. There are frictional labor markets with
search and matching. Search is directed and markets are labeled by age of the worker,
human capital and the first period payment to the worker. After the first period, wages
are determined through a Nash-bargaining process. There are aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic (match-specific) productivity shocks.
3.4.1 Demographics
• There is continuum of workers of measure normalized to one, uniformly distributed
across overlapping generations with age t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Each worker is endowed
with one indivisible unit of labor.
• The mass of entering (newly born) workers is equal to 1/T which equals the mass
of retiring/dying workers.
• There is a continuum of firms with positive measure (continuum of potential firms
having infinite mass).
10The role of segmented/two-tier labor markets has also been analyzed, see Blanchard & Landier
(2002) and Cahuc & Postel-Vinay (2002).
11Introducing this dimension is straightforward, as it amounts to solving for the block recursive
equilibrium for the different types of ex-ante heterogeneous workers. With that extension markets are
also indexed by ability of the worker.
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3.4.2 Preferences and Technology
• We assume risk neutrality for both workers and firms and a common discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1).
• Stochastic shocks: aggregate productivity is denoted y ∈ Y with AR(1) process
Λ(y′ | y) and match idiosyncratic productivity z ∈ Z with AR(1) process denoted
Λ(z′ | z), we may also write s = (z, y) and Λ(s′ | s) as the joint process (this allows
for more general joint stochastic processes).
• The human capital of the worker is h ∈ R+, which evolves according to the law
of motion h′ = h + 1 for the periods during which the worker is employed and
remains fixed when the worker is not employed. There is an initial level of human
capital h for all newborn workers. When a match between a worker and a firm is
destroyed, human capital depreciates to µ(h), with lower bound at h. The upper
bound on human capital is h, with h ≤ T .
• Production is carried out in a match between a firm and a worker with production
technology f(y, z, h).
3.4.3 Markets
• There is continuum of markets labeled by (w, h, t, y) ∈ R+ × N3 where firms
commit to pay w for the first period of the match to a worker with (h, t).
• After the initial period the wage is determined through Nash-bargaining when the
worker has no alternative job offer. We assume the worker accepts an offer in the
market he has chosen to search12.
• The measure of unemployed workers is written as u(h, t) where u : N2 → R+, the
measure of employed workers is e(z, h, t) where e : Z ×N2 → R+. The aggregate
state vector is then ψ = (u, e, y).
• The tightness for a labor market with (w, h, t) is denoted θt(w, h, ψ).
12At the bargaining stage the idiosyncratic productivity level available for production for a potential
new match is known but not the value that will be effective for production at the existing match in that
same period.
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3.4.4 Timing
For the rest of this section we assume that a block recursive equilibrium exists and omit
ψ from the vector of state variables, the aggregate shock y does remain as a relevant
aggregate state variable. The existence of the block recursive equilibrium is proven by
construction in the appendix, following the methodology of Menzio et al. (2012) for a
life cycle economy with directed search and free-entry of firms (adapted to introduce
our extensions). The timing within a period is as follows:
• Entry-and-Exit of Workers, Aggregate Shock. At the beginning of the
period newly born workers enter the market and workers of age T + 1 retire and
die. The aggregate productivity shock y is revealed.
• Search and Matching. The unemployed workers search for a job with prob-
ability λu, while employed workers are allowed to search for an alternative job
with probability λe. A firm opens a vacancy after paying vacancy cost cv. A
worker in market (w, h, t, y) meets a vacancy with probability p(θt(w, h, y)) where
p : R+ → [0, 1] is a twice-differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave function with p(0) = 0 and p(∞)=1. A vacancy in market (w, h, t, y)
meets a worker with probability q(θt(w, h, y)) where q : R+ → [0, 1] is a twice-
differentiable, strictly decreasing function and with q(θ) = p(θ)/θ, q(0) = 1 and
q(∞)=0.
• Wage Determination. When the worker meets a new firm, the firm pays the
initial posted w in the first period. If the worker is matched with no alternative job
offers, the wage is determined through Nash-bargaining with the current firm. If
no agreement is reached, the match is destroyed. The unemployed worker accepts
the offer he receives (if any), otherwise produces and consumes b.
• Production. The idiosyncratic productivity state at the beginning of the period
is z, at the production stage the new idiosyncratic shock z′ is revealed (for new
matches it is known in advance13 and equal to z). The match produces f(y, z′, h).
The accumulation of human capital takes place with production: a matched worker
13We may set z equal to any value z ∈ Z.
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that enters the period and produces with human capital h, is endowed with human
capital h′ = h+ 1 immediately after production takes place. The matched worker
gets paid and his consumption takes place.
• Exogenous Separation. There is a probability δ of a shock that destroys the
match (exogenous job destruction).
3.4.5 Value of the Worker
Let’s consider in parts the problem of the unemployed worker before the search stage.
With probability λu the unemployed individual has the possibility of searching, if suc-
cessful receives wage wu and enters next period as an employed worker with probability
1− δ. This part of the value of the unemployed worker is given by:
λu p(θt(w
u, h, y))
{
wu + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y) ((1− δ)Vt+1(h′, z, y′) + δ Ut+1(µ(h′), y′))}
All new matches produce with idiosyncratic productivity value z in their first period
of existence, it will also be the state value at the beginning of the following period.
The unemployed worker may remain unemployed for two reasons: he was not given a
chance to search for a job, or was unsuccessful in his search. In this case, he produces
and consumes b today and enters the next period with unemployment status, with
unchanged level of human capital at age t+ 1. This component can be written as:
(1− λu p( · ))
{
b+ β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)Ut+1(h, y′)
}
We can write the beginning-of-the-period value of unemployment as:
Ut(h, y) = max{wu}
b+ β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)
{
Ut+1(h, y
′) + λu p(θt(wu, h, y))Sut (w
u, h, y′)
}
where Sut (w
u, h, y′) summarizes the gain for the worker of finding a match:
Sut (w
u, h, y′) =
[
wu − b
β
+ (1− δ)Vt+1(h′, z, y′) + δ Ut+1(µ(h′), y′)− Ut+1(h, y′)
]
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Vt+1 is the beginning of the period value of the matched worker (after the aggregate
shock is revealed). The policy function of the unemployed worker is wut (h, y).
A matched worker may be given a chance to search for an alternative job offer
with probability λe, if successful he receives the posted wage of the corresponding labor
market and enters the next period as a matched worker with probability 1 − δ, this
possibility can be written as:
λe p(θt(w
a, h, y))
{
wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y) ((1− δ)Vt+1(h′, z, y′) + δ Ut+1(µ(h′), y′))}
If the currently matched worker does not receive an alternative job offer:
(1− λe p( · ))V bt (h, z, y)
where the wage in V bt (h, z, y) is determined through Nash-bargaining. The value func-
tion is then:
Vt(h, z, y) =λe p( · )
{
wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y) ((1− δ)Vt+1(h′, z, y′) + δ Ut+1(µ(h′), y′))}
+ (1− λe p( · ))V bt (h, z, y)
The policy function for a matched worker is denoted wat (h, z, y). Before discussing
how this value is determined through the bargaining process it will be useful to describe
the problem of the firm.
3.4.6 Value of the Firm
At the beginning of the period, when the aggregate shock is revealed, the value of
a currently matched firm is Ft(h, z, y). After the search stage there are two possible
situations, with probability λe p(θt(w
a, h, y)) the worker has found an alternative job
offer and the previous match is destroyed. If the worker has no alternative job offer the
new value of the firm is determined at the bargaining stage F bt (h, z, y). We can then
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write the beginning-of-the-period value of the firm as:
Ft(h, z, y) = (1− λe p(θt(wa, h, y)))F bt (h, z, y)
The value of a newly matched firm is Gt(w
a, h, z, y):
Gt(w
a, h, z, y) = f(y, z, h)− wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)Ft+1(h′, z, y′),
We turn next to the bargaining stage.
3.4.7 Determination of Wages
If the worker was unsuccessful in obtaining an alternative offer (whether because he
did not have the possibility of searching, or was not successful in the search stage), his
outside option is (human capital depreciates if the match is destroyed):
b+ β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)Ut+1(µ(h), y′)
while reaching an agreement with the current employer gives (before z′ is revealed):
wb + β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)Vt+1(h′, z′, y′) + δ Ut+1(µ(h′), y′)
}
For the firm, at the bargaining stage the outside value is zero. The value of main-
taining the match is:
F bt (h, z, y) = −wb +
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)Ft+1(h′, z′, y′)
}
Note that current period production takes place with productivity value z′ and y.
There is a cutoff function zbt (h, y), the lowest level of the idiosyncratic productivity shock
such that the joint surplus of the match is non-negative. Given these values, worker
and firm bargain over the wage, through a Nash-bargaining process where the worker
has bargaining power ξ (see Appendix). Finally FT+1 = 0, UT+1 = 0 and VT+1 = 0.
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3.4.8 New Vacancies and Free Entry Condition
To close the model we specify the free entry condition of firms. The cost of a vacancy
is cv, in equilibrium the following condition has to hold:
cv ≥ q(θt(w, h, y))
{
f(y, z, h)− w + β (1− δ)
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)Ft+1(h′, z, y′)
}
and θt(w, h, y) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness.
3.5 Block Recursive Equilibrium
Definition. A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) consists of value functions Ut for
unemployed workers, Vt for employed workers, Ft for previously matched firms andGt for
newly matched firms, policy functions wut for unemployed workers and w
a
t for employed
workers, a bargained wage function wbt determined between an employed worker and a
firm, a cutoff productivity function zbt , and a tightness function θt for t = 1, ..., T such
that (i) Ut, Vt, Ft, Gt, w
u
t , w
a
t , w
b
t , z
b
t and θt depend on ψ only through y for t = 1, ..., T ,
(ii) Ft, Gt and θt are consistent with the firm’s rationality and the free-entry condition
for t = 1, ..., T , (iii) Ut and w
u
t solve the unemployed worker’s problem for t = 1, ..., T ,
(iv) Vt and w
a
t solve the employed worker’s problem for t = 1, ..., T , and (v) w
b
t and z
b
t
solve the bargaining problem between an employed worker and a firm for t = 1, ..., T .
Theorem. A recursive equilibrium exists and is block recursive and unique.
The proof is in the appendix for the case without human capital depreciation (the
extension is straightforward). To gain some intuition on this result first consider the
assumption of directed search. Markets are indexed by age and human capital of the
worker (and ability when this extension is considered). Thus, a firm opening a vacancy
in a particular market will know the characteristics of the worker that it will potentially
find. If search was not directed, to calculate the expected discounted profits of open-
ing a vacancy the firm would need to know the distribution of workers with different
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characteristics (for example, human capital determines in part the productivity of the
match).
In the market that the workers searches for a job the number of vacancies will adjust
so that the free-entry condition holds for the firms. There are different pairs of first-
period wages and market tightness that could deliver zero expected discounted profits
for firms. The additional condition that determines this pair in equilibrium is a concave
maximization search problem for each particular type of worker. In the last period of
the worker, it is straightforward to verify that all value and policy functions as well
as bargained wages are independent of the distribution of workers over their individual
state variables. By backward induction a block recursive equilibrium can be constructed.
3.6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we describe the specification employed for the different functions of the
model, the calibration strategies and standard parameters employed in the literature.
We then simulate the economy to evaluate the role of the tax-wedge on unemployment
rates.
3.6.1 Baseline Parameters and Function Specifications
We modify the production function of Menzio et al. (2012), by considering an AR(1)
process for idiosyncratic productivity shocks, AR(1) process for aggregate productivity,
heterogeneous ability of workers. The production function is:
f(a, y, z, h) = a ez+y hγ
where a is the permanent ability of the individual, z is the match-idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shock, y is the aggregate productivity shock, γ determines curvature with respect
to human capital in the production function.
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• A time period is one month and β ∈ [0.996, 0.9967] is typically calibrated so that
the annual real interest rate is equal to 4-5 percent.
• Bargaining power is equal for firms and workers, ξ = 1/2.
• We set the home production parameter b to target a total average unemployment
rate of 6.5 percent. The vacancy cost is set to 10.42 times the value of home
production following Menzio et al. (2012).
• In the case with no initial heterogeneity a = 1, with heterogeneity a ∈ {0.9, 1.0, 1.1}
with weights {0.25, 0.50, 0.25}, respectively. The range of human capital is from
h = 1 to h (set to match the peak of mean earnings, Huggett et al., 2006).
The function for human capital depreciation is the grid approximation to µ(h) =
h/(1.08).
Table 3.3: Parameters
parameter description par. value
discount factor β 0.996
periods of life T 40× 12
vacancy cost cv 10.42× b
production - curvature γ 0.06
human capital range h 25× 12
human capital depreciation µ(h) h/(1.08)
exogenous destruction δ 0.01
unemployed search prob. λu 1.00
on-the-job search prob. λe 0.80
matching function p(θ) min{θ1/2, 1}
aggregate process autocorrelation ρy 0.90
aggregate process volatility σy 0.01
idiosyncratic process autocorrelation ρz 0.00
idiosyncratic process volatility σz 0.12
bargaining parameter ξ 1/2
Parameters related to probabilities and distributions:
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• For the aggregate productivity process Λ(y′ | y), considering a quarterly time pe-
riod, Den Haan et al. (2000) utilize an autocorrelation14 of 0.95 and standard
deviation 0.007. Pries (2008), in a monthly model, selects the autocorrelation
and the standard deviation process to target quarterly US data on real average
output per worker in the non-farm business sector, with autocorrelation of 0.878
and standard deviation of 0.02.
• For the idiosyncratic productivity process, Den Haan et al. (2000) consider an
iid shock with standard deviation equal to 0.101. Bils et al. (2011) consider a
persistence of idiosyncratic productivity of 0.97 and a standard deviation of 0.13.
The initial idiosyncratic productivity level for new matches is set to the highest
idiosyncratic productivity level.
• For long-term employment relationships, quarterly US worker separation rates lie
in the range 8-10 percent (Den Haan et al , 2000; pg. 490). Den Haan et al.
(2000) consider a 10 percent rate of total separation (see also Pries, 2008), with
an exogenous separation rate of 0.068. We consider exogenous job destruction
and the possibility of endogenous job destruction. In Menzio & Shi (2011) the
exogenous destruction rate is δ ∈ {0.012, 0.026}.
• λe determines the rate of transition to new jobs, λu governs the rate of transition
from unemployment to employment. In Menzio & Shi (2011) λe ∈ {0.735, 0.904}.
3.6.2 Business Cycle Simulations
We conduct simulations to learn about the impact of the tax-wedge and the role of
heterogeneity in the ability of workers. The benchmark tax wedge is 0.344.15 In the
case of no heterogeneity, for example, increasing the tax wedge by 5 p.p. increases the
unemployment rate from 0.065 to 0.079.
14We apply the Rouwenhorst method of approximating a stationary AR(1) process following Kopecky
& Suen (2010), this method is found to be reliable relative to other methods in approximating highly
persistent processes.
15The OECD definition of the total tax wedge: combined central and sub-central government income
tax plus employee and employer social security contribution taxes, as a percentage of labour costs defined
as gross wage earnings plus employer social security contributions. For the US the total tax wedge is
34.4%.
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Table 3.4: Business Cycle Simulations: No Heterogeneity
average τ = 0.344 τ = 0.394 τ = 0.444
youth unemployment 0.094 0.114 0.164
prime unemployment 0.059 0.071 0.102
total unemployment 0.065 0.079 0.115
volatility τ = 0.344 τ = 0.394 τ = 0.444
youth unemployment 0.037 0.039 0.039
prime unemployment 0.036 0.048 0.058
total unemployment 0.026 0.041 0.050
The unemployment rate for workers of age 21-25 is always higher16 compared to
the unemployment rate for those aged 35-45 and the total unemployment rate. The
tax wedge increases the volatility of unemployment rates in the case of no heterogene-
ity, but the effect is not monotonic in a version of the model with ex-ante heterogeneity.17
Table 3.5: Business Cycle Simulations: With Heterogeneity
average τ = 0.344 τ = 0.394 τ = 0.444
youth unemployment 0.093 0.118 0.343
prime unemployment 0.058 0.073 0.294
total unemployment 0.065 0.082 0.305
volatility τ = 0.344 τ = 0.394 τ = 0.444
youth unemployment 0.039 0.046 0.016
prime unemployment 0.042 0.052 0.011
total unemployment 0.032 0.045 0.010
3.6.3 Simulations of a Recession
In this section we simulate two economies, one with a tax wedge of 0.344 and an-
other economy with a tax wedge 10 percentage points higher, equal to 0.444. In both
16Individuals enter the market unemployed at age 20, we give them one year to find a job (12
opportunities) and consider age 21-25 for youth unemployment.
17For the computation of volatility, we first take the natural log of the series, then remove the Hodrick-
Prescott trend with a filter parameter of 105 (see Pries, 2005).
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economies the aggregate productivity shock permanently falls from the highest to lowest
possible state. In the high tax-wedge economy, the starting difference between youth
and total unemployment is larger compared to the low tax-wedge economy and is more
amplified by a recession.
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Figure 3.1: Simulation of a Recession
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3.6.4 Losses due to Unemployment in Present Discounted Values
In this final quantitative section we compute the expected present discounted losses in
labor earnings caused by unemployment (graphs in the appendix). The graphs show the
ratio of the expected present discounted value of labor earnings of an employed worker
of a particular age (in months starting at 20 years old), relative to the expected present
discounted value of labor earnings for an individual of the same age that lost his job and
whose human capital depreciated accordingly.18 The graphs show this ratio for different
ages and in 5 different states of the aggregate productivity (5 is the highest aggregate
productivity and 1 is the lowest). The main results are that losses are bigger: (1) in
worse aggregate states of the economy, (2) for younger individuals, (3) in the economy
with the higher tax wedge. Additionally, in a version of the model with ex-ante hetero-
geneity, the losses are larger for low ability individuals.
3.7 Final Comments
Recessions generate sizable losses for young workers entering the labor force. Unem-
ployment generates a direct income loss but also a fall in future income attributed to
foregone human capital accumulation. We analyze a life-cycle model of workers with
heterogeneous ability and on-the-job human capital accumulation and depreciation due
to job loss19. We find that unemployment rates of young workers are typically higher
and more sensitive to the tax-wedge, consistent with the empirical estimates. Long-term
earnings losses generated by match destruction are bigger: (1) in worse aggregate states
of the economy, (2) for younger individuals, (3) in the economy with the higher tax
wedge, (4) for ex-ante low ability individuals.
18See the appendix for a mathematical derivation of the expected present discounted value of labor
earnings.
19This depreciation may be due to firm-specific or occupation-specific human capital. Kambourov
& Manovskii (2009) find that when occupational experience is taken into account, tenure in a certain
industry or a particular employer has quantitatively little importance in accounting for wages. This
evidence could be interpreted as contrary to information theories of wage formation where employer
learn about the productivity of their workers. Occupation specific human capital is transferable across
employers.
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Figure 3.2: Losses due to Unemployment
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Size Distribution of Firms
The data for the US distribution of firms is from Helfand et al. (2007), average 1990-
2000. These statistics account for 97% of the total number of employees in private
industries (code USPRIV, Federal Reserve Economic Data). The size distribution of
firms data (establishment data is also available) can be compared to that of Rossi-
Hansberg & Wright (2007), taking the average of the years 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995,
1997 and 2000 (includes firms with zero employees), see Table A.1. OECD (2002) also
provides information for the US on the distribution of enterprises by size class (Table
A.1).
For Turkey, the data is from World Bank (2010) and OECD (2002) (similar numbers
are obtained from TurkStat, Household Labour Force Survey). Note that from OECD
(2002) the size categories are different for US and Turkey. Data for registered work-
places is available from the Social Security Institution (see Kenar, 2009).
For Egypt, data is from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
(CAPMAS), the main statistical agency of the Egyptian government, Establishment
Census 1996 (see Ministry of Foreign Trade, 2003). The Egyptian data, for non-
agricultural activities, is divided in sizes 1-4, 5-14, 15-49 and 50+ workers (Ministry
of Foreign Trade, 2003, Table 1 for establishments and Table 4 for employment). The
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dist. of firms by size is: 92.7, 6.12, 0.91, and 0.3% respectively. Figures obtained from
the 2006 Economic Census are shown in Table A.1.
Table A.1: Distribution of Enterprises and Employment by Size Class
% enterprises 0-9 10-19 20-99 100-499 500+
US (OECD) 56.8 15.8 20.7 5.2 1.5
US (Rossi-Hansberg & Wright, 2007) 78.7 10.8 8.8 1.4 0.2
US (Helfand et al., 2007) 74.5 12.5 10.6 1.9 0.4
% enterprises 0-9 10-49 50-99 100-499 500+
Turkey (OECD) 95.0 3.2 0.8 0.9 0.2
% enterprises and employment 1-9 10-49 50-249 250-499 500+
Turkey (% of registered enterprises) 85.5 12.5 1.7 0.2 0.1
Turkey (% of registered workers) 28.6 32.5 21.8 7.5 9.6
% establishments and employment 0-1 2-10 11-100 101-1,000 1,000+
Egypt (% of formal sector estab.) 90.34 7.82 1.71 0.13 0.01
Egypt (% of formal sector workers) 51.94 22.35 11.19 9.34 5.18
A.2 Tax Structure
Tax rates in Turkey1 and Egypt, for the years 2000-2002 were as follows:
• the corporate income tax rate for Turkey was 33% (no special treatment for small-
medium enterprises, OECD-2002), in Egypt the standard corporate income tax
rate is 40%, reduced to 32% for manufacturing,
• the tax in Turkey for income from capital investments (interests and dividends)
is included in the taxable gross income of individuals, the rate varies 0.15-0.35.
For Egypt the unified income tax applies to commercial and industrial profits, the
range is 20-40%.
1For Turkey the data is from the OECD Tax Database and KPMG. For Egypt the data is from
Kheir-El-Din et al. (2001) and El-Ehwany & Metwally (2001).
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Table A.2: Tax Structures
type of tax US Turkey Egypt
corporate income 0.353 0.330 0.32-0.40
corporate distributions (dividends) 0.174 0.15-0.35 0.20-0.40
employer social sec. contribution 0.076 0.215 0.220
labor-tax (Djankov et al., 2010) 0.072 0.229 0.217
total tax % of profits (W.B.) 0.46 0.53 0.54
OECD total tax wedge (2002) 0.301 0.425 –
For the US, taxes on corporate income and corporate distributions respectively, are
taken from McGrattan & Prescott (2005). Both are estimated averages for the period
1990-2001. The OECD Tax Database shows 0.35 as the central government corporate in-
come tax rate2, for the same period, similar to the one in McGrattan & Prescott (2005).
For both the US and Turkey the marginal rate for employer social security contribu-
tions is available. For the US, more specifically, it is the rate for annual gross earnings
in the range of $7-106 thousand from the OECD Tax Database, 2002-2003. For Egypt
the rate of total contributions is 36% of the basic salary, 14% are contributions of the
employee and 22% is paid by the employer.
Djankov et al. (2010) estimate labor taxes as the sum of all labor-related taxes,
including payroll taxes, mandatory social security contributions, mandatory health in-
surance, mandatory unemployment insurance, and any local contributions that are pro-
portional to payroll or number of employees. These estimations are based on taxes
applicable to a standardized domestic enterprise and are expressed as a percentage of
pre-tax earnings.
Finally, the OECD tax wedge a measure of the difference between labor costs to the
employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee is calculated by
expressing the sum of personal income tax, employee plus employer social security con-
tributions together with any payroll tax, minus benefits as a percentage of labor costs.
2The rate is closer to 0.39 when combining the central and sub-central (statutory) rates given by the
adjusted, for deductions in respect of sub-central tax, central government rate plus the sub-central rate.
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The OECD recognizes that this measure may be less than the true labor costs faced
by employers because, for example, employers may also have to make non-tax compul-
sory payments. In the same way employees take home may be reduced if they have to
pay such non-tax payments. The average tax wedge measures identify that part of to-
tal labor costs which is taken in tax and social security contributions net of cash benefits.
A.3 Robustness Exercise
The following table documents the distribution of employment and firms by size class
obtained by the model when considering an autocorrelation parameter of ρ = 0.75 for
idiosyncratic shocks (parameters for the distribution of entrepreneurial ability are un-
changed from the baseline specification).
Table A.3: Distribution of Employment and Firms by Size Class
% employment 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-499 500-999 1,000+
US - data† 11.45 7.70 11.08 8.43 17.89 6.91 36.55
US - model 14.18 7.74 9.32 8.51 17.64 7.89 34.72
% firms 1-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-499 500-999 1,000+
US - data 74.27 12.56 8.06 2.69 2.00 0.22 0.20
US - model 75.12 12.54 6.99 2.84 1.96 0.27 0.27
†Helfand et al. (2007), average 1995-2000.
A.4 Algorithm Outline
Given the interest rate and government policies, computing the equilibrium amounts
to finding the wage w that clears the labor market. The grid for the ability variable ϕ
consists of 20 points, with weights given by a discretized Log-normal distribution. The
Markov matrix Λ(a′ | a) is constructed following Tauchen (1986), with 9 possible state
values. The grid for financial assets b has up to 750 points (as necessary depending
on parameters and ability of the entrepreneur). The algorithm can be summarized as
follows:
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(1) Guess wage level w.
(2) Solve for quantities3 {q(s, z)}z∈{i,f}, production inputs {l(s, z), k(s, z)}z∈{i,f}, prof-
its {pi(s, z)}z∈{i,f}.
(3) Through value function iteration, until a desired level of precision is reached,
obtain policy and value functions {gz(s)}z∈{i,f,w}, {v(s), vi(s), vf (s), vw(s)}.
(4) Run 300 simulations of 25,000 individuals for 200 periods (this requires less mem-
ory than fewer simulations with more individuals, it is verified that increasing
the number of simulations/individuals/periods does not change the results). The
number of individuals with each entrepreneurial ability level is determined by the
weights given by the parameterized Log-normal distribution. An individual that
dies is replaced by another individual with the same entrepreneurial ability.
(5) Compute the aggregates using the cross section of the last period of the simulations
and check the market clearing condition for labor. Return to step (1) and adjust
w and calibrated parameters as necessary.
3In the case of government enforcement (where detection depending on output is considered), output
decisions and value functions are solved jointly for informal sector firms.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Output-Capital Ratios and Financial Constraints
Consider a standard profit maximization problem of a firm with access to a production
technology with decreasing returns to scale (as the one in the quantitative framework)
and productivity z:
max
{k,l}
z (kα l1−α)ν − w l − (r + δ) k
subject to a restriction k ≤ k (where k is derived from a financial constraint). It
is straightforward to derive from the first order condition of capital that αν (q/k) =
r + δ + γ where γ ≥ 0 is a multiplier on the financial constraint.
B.2 Size Distribution of Establishments
The source of data for the US in Table B.1 is Statistics of U.S. Businesses1 (Census
Bureau). Industries are classified according to NAICS:2 manufacturing (codes 31-33),
retail (44-45), services includes the following 2 digit categories: 48-49 (transportation
and warehousing), 51 (information), 52 (finance and insurance), 53 (real estate and
1http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/
2http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chart=2007
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rental and leasing), 54 (professional, scientific and technical services), 55 (management
of companies and enterprises), 56 (administrative and support and waste management
and remediation services), 71 (arts, entertainment and recreation), 72 (accommodation
and food services), 81 (other services, except public administration). I exclude the fol-
lowing categories: 61 (educational services), 62 (health care and social assistance), 92
(public administration), 11 (agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting), 21 (mining, quar-
rying, oil and gas extraction), 22 (utilities), 23 (construction). The group all sectors
includes the total of the non-excluded categories, this accounts for a total of 78.5 mil-
lion workers. Including all the categories accounts for 111.97 million workers (the size
distribution including all categories does not show significant changes).
For Mexico, the data in Table B.1 is from Busso, Fazio & Levy (2012), corresponding
to the Economic Census 2004. We note that the data understates true differences given
the under-representation of small firms in Mexico, in particular those in the informal
sector (see Busso, Madrigal & Pages, 2012; Leal Ordon˜ez, 2013).
Table B.1: Distribution of Establishments and Employment
USA1 establishments employment
shares in % <5 5-9 10-49 ≥50 <5 5-9 10-49 ≥50
all sectors 47.52 12.56 ⇒ 39.92 5.32 5.48 ⇒ 89.20
manufacturing 36.81 15.77 ⇒ 47.43 1.89 2.90 ⇒ 95.21
manufacturing2 40.47 14.05 29.21 16.27 1.90 2.28 15.77 80.06
retail 37.85 12.67 ⇒ 49.47 5.18 5.97 ⇒ 88.85
services 50.96 12.29 ⇒ 36.76 6.06 5.87 ⇒ 88.06
Mexico3 establishments employment
shares in % ≤5 6-10 11-50 >50 ≤5 6-10 11-50 >50
all sectors 90.62 4.95 3.49 0.94 35.17 7.50 14.86 42.47
manufacturing 83.42 7.44 6.01 3.13 13.85 4.30 10.28 71.56
retail 93.37 3.67 2.47 0.49 53.58 8.47 15.76 22.19
services 88.64 6.14 4.28 0.95 34.67 9.23 17.83 38.26
1Statistics of U.S. Businesses (CB), 2Cole, Greenwood & Sanchez (2012),
3Busso, Fazio & Levy (2012).
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B.3 Dispersion in Output-Capital Ratios in Colombia
Table B.2 documents the dispersion in the log-output/capital ratios for the AMS database,
where capital includes buildings, structures, machinery and equipment. In each year
and for each 4 digit industry I take firms with more than 10 workers. Within each
industry that has more than 20 observations I compute the variance and the difference
in the levels of different percentiles. For each year I then take the average of a particular
measure across industries.
Table B.2: Dispersion in Output-Capital Ratios
statistic1 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 82-982
variance 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.2 1.7
90-10 percentiles 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.1
85-15 percentiles 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.5
80-20 percentiles 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.0
80-50 percentiles 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0
# 4 digit industries 57 60 59 57 54 57
avg. # observations per industry 83 81 84 70 68 78
Source: computed w/AMS-DANE (1982-1998).
1Average across 4 digit industries, ratios in logs. 2Average 17 years.
B.4 Micro-Enterprizes in Mexico
The National Survey of Micro-Enterprizes (ENAMIN) is conducted every two years and
includes data on firms with up to 15 workers in manufacturing, and up to 10 workers in
construction, transportation, retail and services. INEGI estimates that approximately
41.6% of the labor force belongs to firms in this scale of production (approximately
18.1 million workers). The data collected by this survey includes information on the
manager/owner of the firm: education, experience, time in present position and reasons
for setting up a business, among other variables. Regarding the firm itself, the infor-
mation collected includes: year the business was established, accounting and registry,
equipment, expenditures, investment, income, access to finance and number of workers,
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among other variables.
The survey provides information of registration of the firm (whether it belongs to
the informal sector). Approximately 17.6 thousand of the business managers/owners
replied that they had not initiated any formal process of registration with Government
authorities in the 2010 survey (6.9 thousand replied that they had). Considering the
firms that had not initiated any formal registration process the main activities (ac-
counting for 70% of the group of non-registered firms) were the following: retail of
food, beverages and tobacco (code 4611, 11.6%), preparation of food and beverages
(7221, 8.6%), intermediation and retail of massive communications media (4690, 7.3%),
contractors in construction (2382, 5.7%), food industry (3110, 5.5%), personal services
(8121, 4.1%), preparation of food and beverages without fixed location (7222, 3.8%),
repairs and maintenance of equipment, machinery, household and personal appliances
(8112, 3.6%), retail of food and beverages without fixed location (4612, 3.5%), main-
tenance of automobiles and trucks (8111, 3.3%), fabrication of clothing (3150, 3%),
residential construction (2361, 2.9%), retail of clothing, accessories and footwear (4631,
2.9%), retail of clothing, accessories and footwear without fixed location (4632, 2.4%),
manufacturing of textiles except clothing (3140, 2.3%).
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Block Recursive Equilibrium
This appendix proves the existence and uniqueness of the Block Recursive Equilibrium
for an economy without human capital depreciation (this extension is straightforward).
Definition. A Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE) consists of value functions Ut for
unemployed workers, Vt for employed workers, Ft for previously matched firms and Gt
for newly matched firms, policy functions wut for unemployed workers and w
a
t for em-
ployed workers, a bargained wage function wbt determined between an employed worker
and a firm, a cutoff productivity function zbt , and a tightness function θt for t = 1, ..., T
such that (i) Ut, Vt, Ft, Gt, w
u
t , w
a
t , w
b
t , z
b
t and θt depend on ψ only through y for
t = 1, ..., T , (ii) Ft, Gt and θt are consistent with the firm’s rationality and the free-
entry condition for t = 1, ..., T , (iii) Ut and w
u
t solve the unemployed worker’s problem
for t = 1, ..., T , (iv) Vt and w
a
t solve the employed worker’s problem for t = 1, ..., T , and
(v) wbt and z
b
t solve the bargaining problem between an employed worker and a firm for
t = 1, ..., T .
Theorem. A recursive equilibrium exists and is block recursive and unique.
Proof. We construct a block recursive equilibrium. Denote a statement “Ut, Vt, Ft,
Gt, w
u
t , w
a
t , w
b
t , z
b
t and θt are uniquely computed and they depend on ψ only through y
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for t” as (St). We first show that (ST ) holds and then proceed by backward induction.
At age T the value of an unemployed worker with no job offer after the search stage
is:
UnT (h, ψ) = b,
and we can write as UnT (h, ψ) = U
n
T (h, y).
At the bargaining stage, if an agreement can be reached (the joint surplus is positive),
the value of remaining in the current match for a worker without an alternative job offer
is given by the bargained wage function:
wbT (h, z, ψ),
while the outside option at this stage is UnT (h, y), and the value of the firm (recalling
that FT+1 = 0) is:
−wbT (h, z, ψ) +
∑
{z′}
Λ(z′ | z) f(y, z′, h),
and the outside value of the firm is zero.
Thus, at age T, the bargaining problem for the continuing match is:
max
{wb}
{
wb − b
}ξ{
− wb +
∑
{z′}
Λ(z′ | z) f(y, z′, h)
}1−ξ
,
the joint surplus is:
−b+
∑
{z′}
Λ(z′ | z) f(y, z′, h).
Let the cutoff productivity zbT (h, ψ) be the lowest z such that the joint surplus is
non-negative. Noting that y is the only necessary component in ψ to determine this
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cutoff, zbT (h, ψ) = z
b
T (h, y).
If z ≥ zbT (h, y), the bargaining problem has a unique solution:
wbT (h, z, ψ) = (1− ξ) b+ ξ
∑
{z′}
Λ(z′ | z) f(y, z′, h),
otherwise the bargaining fails and the employed worker and the firm receive the outside
value. We can see that wbT (h, z, ψ) = w
b
T (h, z, y).
Therefore, at the bargaining stage the employed worker’s value is:
V bT (h, z, ψ) =
wbT (h, z, y) if z ≥ zbT (h, y),b if z < zbT (h, y),
and the firm’s value is:
F bT (h, z, ψ) =
−wbT (h, z, y) +
∑
{z′} Λ(z
′ | z) f(y, z′, h) if z ≥ zbT (h, y),
0 if z < zbT (h, y).
Noting that the right hand sides of the values do not have ψ except y, we can write
V bT (h, z, ψ) = V
b
T (h, z, y) and F
b
T (h, z, ψ) = F
b
T (h, z, y).
On the other hand, the value of the worker that has found an alternative job offer
is simply the wage posted in the market where he has searched:
V aT (w
a, h, z, ψ) = wa,
and this does not depend on ψ directly, so V aT (w
a, h, z, ψ) = V aT (w
a, h, z, y). The value
of the newly matched firm is:
GT (w
a, h, z, ψ) = f(y, z, h)− wa,
and hence GT (w
a, h, z, ψ) = GT (w
a, h, z, y).
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Then, the free-entry condition for the firm at this stage is (for a wage w),
cv ≥ q(θT (w, h, ψ))GT (w, h, z, y)
and θT (w, h, ψ) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness. It follows that:
θT (w, h, ψ) =
q
−1
(
cv
f(y,z,h)−w
)
if cv ≤ f(y, z, h)− w,
0 if cv > f(y, z, h)− w,
and hence θT (w, h, ψ) = θT (w, h, y) as the right hand side depends on ψ only through
y. Equivalently,
w = f(y, z, h)− cvq(θT (w,h,y)) if cv ≤ f(y, z, h)− w,
θT (w, h, y) = 0 if cv > f(y, z, h)− w.
Thus, before the search stage the value of the matched worker is:
VT (h, z, ψ) = max{wa}
{
λep(θT (w
a, h, y))wa + (1− λep(θT (wa, h, y)))V bT (h, z, y)
}
,
= max
{wa}
{
λe(−cvθT (wa, h, y) + p(θT (wa, h, y))(f(y, z, h)− V bT (h, z, y))) + V bT (h, z, y)
}
,
= max
θ≥0
{
λe(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h)− V bT (h, z, y))) + V bT (h, z, y)
}
,
so if f(y, z, h) ≤ V bT (h, z, y) then the solution is zero, and otherwise the objective func-
tion is strictly concave in θ. Thus, this problem has a unique solution θaT (h, z, ψ).
Since the objective function depends on ψ only through y, θaT (h, z, ψ) = θ
a
T (h, z, y) and
VT (h, z, ψ) = VT (h, z, y). Therefore,
waT (h, z, ψ) = f(y, z, h)− cvq(θaT (h,z,y)) if θ
a
T (h, z, y) > 0,
waT (h, z, ψ) ≥ f(y, z, h)− cv if θaT (h, z, y) = 0.
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Noting the market with θ = 0 is empty, without loss of generality:
waT (h, z, ψ) = f(y, z, h)−
cv
q(θaT (h, z, y))
,
and hence waT (h, z, ψ) = w
a
T (h, z, y).
Similarly we have at the beginning of age T value of unemployment:
UT (h, ψ) = max{wu}
{
λup(θT (w
u, h, y))wu + (1− λup(θT (wu, h, y)))UnT (h, y)
}
,
= max
{wu}
{
λu(−cvθT (wu, h, y) + p(θT (wu, h, y))(f(y, z, h)− UnT (h, y))) + UnT (h, y)
}
,
= max
θ≥0
{
λu(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h)− UnT (h, y))) + UnT (h, y)
}
,
so if f(y, z, h) ≤ UnT (h, y) then the solution is zero, and otherwise the objective function
is strictly concave in θ. Thus, this problem has a unique solution θuT (h, ψ). Since the
objective function depends on ψ only through y, θuT (h, ψ) = θ
u
T (h, y) and UT (h, ψ) =
UT (h, y). Therefore, we uniquely specify as:
wuT (h, ψ) = f(y, z, h)−
cv
q(θuT (h, y))
,
and hence wuT (h, ψ) = w
u
T (h, y).
The beginning of age T value of the firm previously matched is
FT (h, z, ψ) = (1− λep(θT (w, h, y)))F bT (h, z, y),
so FT (h, z, ψ) = FT (h, z, y).
Therefore, we can see that (ST ) holds.
We are ready to go back to age T −1. The value of a worker that has not found
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a job at the search stage is:
UnT−1(h, ψ) = b+ β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)UT (h, y′),
so UnT−1(h, ψ) = U
n
T−1(h, y).
At the bargaining stage, if an agreement can be reached through Nash-bargaining,
the value for a worker of remaining in the match is:
wbT−1(h, z, ψ) + β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′)
}
,
while the outside option at this stage is UnT−1(h, y). The value of the firm of remaining
in the match is:
−wbT−1(h, z, ψ) +
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′)
}
,
and the outside value of the firm is fixed at zero.
Thus, at age T − 1, the bargaining problem for the continuing match is:
max{wb}
wb + β∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′)
}
− UnT−1(h, y)
ξ
×
−wb +∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′)
}1−ξ
and the joint surplus is:
−UnT−1(h, y) +
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β ((1− δ) (VT (h′, z′, y′) + FT (h′, z′, y′)) + δUT (h′, y′))
}
.
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The cutoff productivity zbT−1(h, ψ) is the lowest z such that the joint surplus is non-
negative, and zbT−1(h, ψ) = z
b
T−1(h, y) as above.
If z ≥ zbT−1(h, y), the bargaining problem has a unique solution:
wbT−1(h, z, ψ) = ξ
{∑
{s′} Λ(s
′ | s) (f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′))
}
+(1− ξ)
{
UnT−1(h, y)− β
∑
{s′} Λ(s
′ | s) ((1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′))
}
,
otherwise the bargaining fails and the employed worker and the firm receive the outside
value. We can see that wbT−1(h, z, ψ) = w
b
T−1(h, z, y).
Therefore, at the bargaining stage the employed worker’s value is:
V bT−1(h, z, ψ) = w
b
T−1(h, z, y) + β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δUT (h′, y′)
}
,
if z ≥ zbT−1(h, y) and V bT−1(h, z, ψ) = UnT−1(h, y) otherwise. The firm’s value is:
F bT−1(h, z, ψ) = −wbT−1(h, z, y) +
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β(1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′)
}
,
if z ≥ zbT−1(h, y) and F bT−1(h, z, ψ) = 0 otherwise. Thus, we can write V bT−1(h, z, ψ) =
V bT−1(h, z, y) and F
b
T−1(h, z, ψ) = F
b
T−1(h, z, y).
On the other hand, the value of the worker that has found an alternative job offer
is:
V aT−1(w
a, h, z, ψ) = wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′)),
so V aT−1(w
a, h, z, ψ) = V aT−1(w
a, h, z, y). The value of the newly matched firm is:
GT−1(wa, h, z, ψ) = f(y, z, h)− wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′),
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and hence GT−1(wa, h, z, ψ) = GT−1(wa, h, z, y).
Then, the free-entry condition is:
cv ≥ q(θT−1(w, h, ψ))GT−1(w, h, z, y)
and θT−1(w, h, ψ) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness. It follows that:
θT−1(w, h, ψ) = q−1
(
cv
f(y,z,h)−wa+β∑{y′} Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′,z,y′)
)
if cv ≤ f(y, z, h) − w + β
∑
{y′} Λ(y
′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′), and θT−1(w, h, ψ) = 0 otherwise,
so θT−1(w, h, ψ) = θT−1(w, h, y) as the right hand side depends on ψ only through y.
Equivalently,
w = f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′} Λ(y
′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′)− cvq(θT−1(w,h,y)) ,
if cv ≤ f(y, z, h)− w + β
∑
{y′} Λ(y
′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′), and θT−1(w, h, ψ) = 0 otherwise.
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Thus, before the search stage the value of the matched worker is:
VT−1(h, z, ψ) = max{wa}
{
λep(θT−1(wa, h, y))[wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))]
+(1− λep(θT−1(wa, h, y)))V bT−1(h, z, y)
}
,
= max
{wa}
{
λe(−cvθT−1(wa, h, y) + p(θT−1(wa, h, y))(f(y, z, h)
+β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′) + (1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− V bT−1(h, z, y)))
+V bT−1(h, z, y)
}
,
= max
θ≥0
{
λe(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′)
+(1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− V bT−1(h, z, y))) + V bT−1(h, z, y)
}
,
so if f(y, z, h)+β
∑
{y′} Λ(y
′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′)+(1−δ)VT (h′, z, y′)+δUT (h′, y′)) ≤ V bT−1(h, z, y)
then the solution is zero, and otherwise the objective function is strictly concave in
θ. Thus, this problem has a unique solution θaT−1(h, z, ψ). Then, θ
a
T−1(h, z, ψ) =
θaT−1(h, z, y) and VT−1(h, z, ψ) = VT−1(h, z, y) as above. Therefore, we uniquely specify:
waT−1(h, z, ψ) = f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′)− cv
q(θaT−1(h, z, y))
,
and hence waT−1(h, z, ψ) = w
a
T−1(h, z, y).
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Similarly we have at the beginning of age T − 1 value of unemployment:
UT−1(h, ψ) = max{wu}
{
λup(θT−1(wu, h, y))[wu + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))]
+(1− λup(θT−1(wu, h, y)))UnT−1(h, y)
}
,
= max
{wu}
{
λu(−cvθT−1(wu, h, y) + p(θT−1(wu, h, y))(f(y, z, h)
+β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′) + (1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− UnT−1(h, y)))
+UnT−1(h, y)
}
,
= max
θ≥0
{
λu(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′)
+(1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− UnT−1(h, y))) + UnT−1(h, y)
}
,
so if f(y, z, h)+β
∑
{y′} Λ(y
′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′)+(1−δ)VT (h′, z, y′)+δUT (h′, y′)) ≤ UnT−1(h, y)
then the solution is zero, and otherwise the objective function is strictly concave in θ.
Thus, this problem has a unique solution θuT−1(h, ψ). Then, θ
u
T−1(h, ψ) = θ
u
T−1(h, y)
and UT−1(h, ψ) = UT−1(h, y). Therefore, we uniquely specify:
wuT−1(h, ψ) = f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′)− cv
q(θuT−1(h, y))
,
and hence wuT−1(h, ψ) = w
u
T−1(h, y).
The beginning of age T − 1 value of the firm previously matched is:
FT−1(h, z, ψ) = (1− λep(θT−1(w, h, y)))F bT−1(h, z, y),
so FT−1(h, z, ψ) = FT−1(h, z, y).
Therefore, we can see that (ST ) implies (ST−1). Hence, by induction, (St) holds for
t = 1, ..., T , i.e. Ut, Vt, Ft, Gt, w
u
t , w
a
t , w
b
t , z
b
t and θt are uniquely computed and they
depend on ψ only through y for t = 1, ..., T . 
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C.2 Introducing the Tax Wedge
We introduce the tax wedge into the baseline framework, with a focus on the parts
of the model that are modified. With a tax wedge τ , if an agreement can be reached
through Nash-bargaining at the bargaining stage, the value for a worker of remaining
in the match is (at age T − 1):
(1− τ)wbT−1(h, z, y) + β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′)
}
,
while the outside option at this stage is UnT−1(h, y). The value of the firm of remaining
in the match conserves its form. Thus, at age T − 1, the bargaining problem for the
continuing match is:
max{wb}
[
−wb +∑{s′} Λ(s′ | s){f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′)}]1−ξ ×[
wb (1− τ) + β∑{s′} Λ(s′ | s){(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′)}− UnT−1(h, y)]ξ
and τ · wb is subtracted from the joint surplus in the original problem.
The cutoff productivity zbT−1(h, y) is the lowest z such that the surplus of both
firm and worker are non-negative. If z ≥ zbT−1(h, y), the bargaining problem has a
unique solution:
wbT−1(h, z, y) = ξ
{∑
{s′} Λ(s
′ | s) (f(y, z′, h) + β (1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′))
}
+(1− ξ) (1− τ)−1
{
UnT−1(h, y)− β
∑
{s′} Λ(s
′ | s) ((1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δ UT (h′, y′))
}
,
otherwise the bargaining fails and the employed worker and the firm receive the outside
value.
Therefore, at the bargaining stage the employed worker’s value is:
V bT−1(h, z, y) = w
b
T−1(h, z, y) (1− τ) + β
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
(1− δ)VT (h′, z′, y′) + δUT (h′, y′)
}
,
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if z ≥ zbT−1(h, y) and V bT−1(h, z, y) = UnT−1(h, y) otherwise. The firm’s value is:
F bT−1(h, z, y) = −wbT−1(h, z, y) +
∑
{s′}
Λ(s′ | s)
{
f(y, z′, h) + β(1− δ)FT (h′, z′, y′)
}
,
if z ≥ zbT−1(h, y) and F bT−1(h, z, y) = 0 otherwise.
On the other hand, the value of the worker that has found an alternative job offer
is:
V aT−1(w
a, h, z, y) = wa (1− τ) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′)),
and the value of the newly matched firm is:
GT−1(wa, h, z, y) = f(y, z, h)− wa + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′),
Then, the free-entry condition is unchanged:
cv ≥ q(θT−1(w, h, y))GT−1(w, h, z, y)
and θT−1(w, h, y) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness.
Thus, before the search stage the value of the matched worker is:
VT−1(h, z, y) = max{wa}
{
λep(θT−1( · ))[wa (1− τ) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ( · )((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))]
+(1− λep(θT−1( · )))V bT−1(h, z, y)
}
Which can alternatively be written as:
VT−1(h, z, y) = max
θ≥0
{
λe(−cvθ (1− τ) + p(θ)(f( · ) (1− τ) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ( · )(FT (h′, z, y′) (1− τ)
+(1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− V bT−1(h, z, y))) + V bT−1(h, z, y)
}
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Using the unique solution θaT−1(h, z, y) for the above problem, we can uniquely
specify:
waT−1(h, z, y) = f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′)− cv
q(θaT−1(h, z, y))
Similarly we have at the beginning of age T − 1 value of unemployment:
UT−1(h, y) = max{wu}
{
λup(θT−1( · ))[wu (1− τ) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ( · )((1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))]
+(1− λup(θT−1( · )))UnT−1(h, y)
}
Which can alternatively be expressed as:
UT−1(h, y) = max
θ≥0
{
λu(−cvθ (1− τ) + p(θ)(f( · ) (1− τ) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)(FT (h′, z, y′) (1− τ)
+(1− δ)VT (h′, z, y′) + δUT (h′, y′))− UnT−1(h, y))) + UnT−1(h, y)
}
,
Therefore, using the unique solution θuT−1(h, y) for the above problem, we uniquely
specify:
wuT−1(h, y) = f(y, z, h) + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y)FT (h′, z, y′)− cv
q(θuT−1(h, y))
The beginning of age T − 1 value of the firm previously matched is
FT−1(h, z, y) = (1− λep(θT−1(w, h, y)))F bT−1(h, z, y).
C.3 Expected Present Discounted Value of Earnings
We compute the expected present discounted value of earnings, for the case of no taxes.
At age T the value of an unemployed worker with no job offer after the search stage is
UnT (h, y) = b. We denote the expected present discounted value of earnings as Uˆ
n
T (h, y) =
0. At the bargaining stage the value of an employed worker is Vˆ bT (h, z, y) = w
b
T (h, z, y)
if z ≥ zbT (h, y) and Vˆ bT (h, z, y) = 0 otherwise. The value for a worker that finds an
132
alternative job offer is V aT (w
a, h, z, y) = Vˆ aT (w
a, h, z, y) = wa. At the search stage the
earnings value of the workers is evaluated at the equilibrium θaT (h, z, y):
VˆT (h, z, y) = λe(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h)− Vˆ bT (h, z, y))) + Vˆ bT (h, z, y)
The earnings value of the unemployed worker at the search stage is:
UˆT (h, y) = λu(−cvθ + p(θ)(f(y, z, h)− UˆnT (h, y))) + UˆnT (h, y)
evaluated at the equilibrium θuT (h, y). Going back one period, the earnings value of an
unemployed worker is:
UˆnT−1(h, y) = 0 + β
∑
{y′}
Λ(y′ | y) UˆT (h, y′)
By backward induction we can compute {Vˆt, Vˆ bt , Vˆ at , Uˆt, Uˆnt } for all t.
